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ABSTRACT: 
The South African negotiations process, in the true spirit of classical liberalism, 
emphasised juridical continuity, legality, and gradual political change. But in spite of this 
and the fact that South Africa’s constitution-making process is acclaimed as the most 
successful negotiated revolution, it is generally recognised that there is incongruity 
between the promise and hope brought about by South Africa’s constitution-making 
process and the political and social crises that ensued after the advent of constitutional 
democracy in the country. I argue in this analysis that the South African constitutional 
discourse must undergo a fundamental shift by abandoning the normative regulation of 
the constituent power of the people in order to allow for the people to truly govern. The 
acknowledgement of the possibility of the unregulated exercise of constituent power 
through people-driven initiatives can mitigate the current malaise facing South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. 
 
 
 
Key words: Constituent power, constituted power, South African Constitution, 
constitution-making, relationalism, liberalism, normativism, decisionism, pluralism, 
constitutional democracy. 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
   1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background  
The pinnacle of the struggle for a democratic South Africa was the negotiations process 
that was initiated in 1985, through sometimes unpublicised discussions between 
representatives of the National Party government and its agencies, business elites, 
academics and individuals, Nelson Mandela who was still in prison at that time, and other 
leading African National Congress (ANC) figures abroad.1 These negotiations culminated 
in 1990 in the unbanning of political organisations such as the ANC, the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), amongst others, 
which had been waging a resilient struggle against apartheid. Apartheid was a system of 
government that was institutionalised by the then governing National Party in 1948, which 
sought to discriminate against and exploit the black and other non-white South African 
population groups. The unbanning of political organisations was closely followed in 1991 
by the official commencement of negotiations for a constitutional democracy through a 
process that came to be known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) at the World Trade Centre, Kempton Park. After the collapse of CODESA 1 
and CODESA 2, a Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) was initiated by the ANC and 
the National Party to pursue the issues that CODESA had failed to resolve.2 After a long 
history of racial oppression and economic exploitation, the negotiations process heralded 
                                                          
1 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 47.  
See also Maharaj M ‘The ANC and South Africa’s Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace. (2008) Berghof 
Transitions Series No. 2 18. 
2 See http://www.sahistory.org.za/codesa-negotiations (accessed on 11 August 2014) 
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an era of hope and promise, particularly for the majority black South African population. 
This was the case because the establishment of a constitutional democracy in South 
Africa, as it is the case in many countries,3 was associated with the redistribution of wealth 
and social transformation. For the majority oppressed people of South Africa, the 
negotiations process also marked both the beginning of the end of minority rule and the 
beginning of an era where the people would govern.  
The South African constitutional democracy that emanated from the negotiations 
process is regarded by some as the best example of a negotiated revolution,4 as opposed 
to populist-democratic revolutions (or the unilateral sovereign constitution-making 
process)5 which have ‘an elective affinity for dictatorship so obviously precarious for 
constitutional democracy.’6 Negotiated revolutions are generally a result of the post-
sovereign constitution-making model which has been employed in several countries with 
varying degrees of success, only to be ‘perfected in South Africa in the 1990s’.7 The post-
sovereign constitution-making model is the constitution-making process whereby 
constituent power is not embodied in a single organ or instance with the plenitude of 
power, but all organs participating in constitutional politics are brought under legal rules, 
                                                          
3 Oklopcic Z ‘Three arenas of struggle: A contextual approach to the constituent power of ‘the people’ Global 
Constitutionalism (2014) 215. 
4 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 26(1) 
SAJHR 20. 
5 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 114. 
6 Arato A ‘Multi-track constitutionalism beyond Carl Schmitt’ (2011) Volume 18(3) Constellations 324. 
7 Arato A ‘Multi-track constitutionalism beyond Carl Schmitt’ (2011) Volume 18(3) Constellations 324. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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wherein the constitutional court plays a significant role in ensuring adherence to legal 
principles.8  
In a nutshell, the negotiations and constitution-writing process in South Africa entailed 
the following: a complete transitional constitution (the interim Constitution of South Africa, 
1993)9 was to be drafted by negotiation prior to the 1994 general elections; the interim 
Constitution was to replace the principles of the Westminster system (parliamentary 
supremacy) with those of a constitutional state; the replacement of the interim 
Constitution by a new text (the South African Constitution)10 within the framework of the 
Constitutional Principles agreed to prior to its coming into operation; and judicial 
certification by the Constitutional Court that the new text conformed to the Constitutional 
Principles.11 On the basis of this process, it is claimed by some that the South African 
negotiations process owes its success to the interruption and fragmentation of the 
sovereignty of the people12 and bringing all organs participating in constitutional politics 
under legal rules.13  
According to Schmitt’s theory of democracy, constituent power, the subject of which 
is the concretely present people, ‘is capable of making the concrete, comprehensive 
decision over the type and form of its own political existence.’14 In South Africa during the 
                                                          
8 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what? (2010) 26 
SAJHR 19. 
9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (henceforth the interim Constitution). 
10 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  
11 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 53-54. 
12 Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s constitution-
making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 78. 
13 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 26(1) 
SAJHR 19. 
14 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 125.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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founding of the new order that replaced the apartheid order, constituent power, the 
people’s act of will, was absorbed and regulated within existing constitutional forms 
(constituted power) in the form of the apartheid-era tricameral parliament and the 
Constitutional Court. In other words, the legal regulation or containment of the people’s 
act of will played a key role in ushering in the constitutional order in South Africa. In fact, 
legal regulation of the exercise of the constituent power of the people continues to be 
pivotal in South African constitutional discourse. However, the question of priority or the 
tension between constituent power and the law is a highly contentious philosophical 
debate in the field of constitutional theory. I will explore this important debate in Section 
2 of the analysis undertaken here. 
 
1.2. Research problem 
As hinted at above, the South African negotiations process, in the true spirit of classical 
liberalism, emphasised juridical continuity, legality, and gradual political change. But in 
spite of this and the fact that South Africa’s constitution-making process is acclaimed as 
the most successful negotiated revolution, it is generally recognised that there is ‘[a] gap 
between the promise of South Africa’s constitution-making process and what is described 
as the ‘political and social crises that developed in its wake’.’15 Put differently, there is a 
contradiction between the ‘constitutional wonder of 1994’ 16  and the challenges and 
                                                          
15 Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s constitution-
making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 66. See also Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. 
South African constitution propelled by the winds of globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 45.  
16 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 63. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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persistent attacks faced by the South African constitutional democracy and constitutional 
institutions. On the social front, the promise of a change for the better in the quality of 
lives of the historically disadvantaged and marginalised black majority of the South 
African polity is still not realised.  
Likewise, the incidence of unprocedural strikes accompanied by high levels of 
violence, particularly in the platinum mines of South Africa, compound the perceived 
threat faced by South Africa’s constitutional democracy. These incidents of violence and 
illegal gatherings, as epitomised by the Marikana massacre,17 can be seen as a revolt 
stemming from the perceived absence of economic transformation under South Africa’s 
liberal constitutional regime. Those ‘who remain excluded from the small circle of benefits 
generated by [the] quasifeudal ‘capitalist’ economy’18 seem to have lost faith that the 
Constitution and constitutional institutions will change their plight to a better life and they 
engage in rebellious activities. Furthermore, the illegal land occupations that were seen 
as early as the 1990s,19 including the recent ones, for example, in Lwandle and Philippi 
in the Western Cape province, can be seen as a revolt against ‘the property clause’20 
enshrined in the Constitution.  
Some define the incidents of violent protests and land grabs as sporadic eruptions of 
mere criminality. However, the emergence of a new political formation, the Economic 
                                                          
17 This refers to the killings related to the protracted platinum mines’ strike led by the Association of Mineworkers 
and Construction Union, which left close to a total of 100 people dead and about 40 miners killed at the hands of 
police on 16 August 2012. 
18 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 106. 
19 Ntsebeza L ‘Land redistribution in South Africa: the property clause revisited in Ntsebeza L & Hall R The Land 
Question in South Africa (2007) 116. 
20 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Freedom Fighters (EFF), in the South African political landscape, which managed to gain 
26 seats in the National Assembly, indicates that that view is not entirely accurate. The 
support gained by the EFF can be ascribed to its employment of a non-normative or anti-
liberal rhetoric directed towards South Africa’s liberal constitutionalism that continues, in 
its view, to subject the people to maladies like landlessness, unemployment and 
economic exploitation of the working class. Furthermore, the EFF’s rejection of the 
property clause by calling for the appropriation of land without compensation21 seems to 
resonate with the sentiments of the historically disadvantaged majority of the South 
African polity.22  These developments bring the liberal normativist thinking that informed 
the crafting of the Constitution into question. For the purpose of clarity, liberal normativism 
refers here to the school of thought that avoids reference to the concept of constituent 
power and the political conditions under which constitutional authority is established.  
Indeed, the misgivings about the constitution-making process, the Constitution and 
constitutional institutions appear to be gaining ground in South Africa. In fact, Venter hints 
that there is an ‘absence of a national belief in constitutionalism as a mechanism by 
means of which the challenges facing the country may be met.’23 He points out that ‘the 
constitutional wonder of 1994 may [be] … in the process of being shattered by the lack of 
                                                          
21 The EFF’s rejection of the property clause is captured in its document titled EFF First People’s Assembly Resolutions 
as follows: Expropriation of South Africa’s land without compensation for equal redistribution in use is the first pillar 
of EFF’s non-negotiable seven cardinal pillars. See under ‘Documents’ in http://effighters.org.za/index.php/ 
(Accessed on 31 January 2016). 
22 During the second quarter of 2015 the people responded by illegally occupying land in various areas of the country. 
See for example http://citizen.co.za/366650/illegal-occupation-of-land-ongoing/ and 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/04/07/premier-warns-against-illegal-land-occupation-in-gauteng 
(Accessed on 9 January 2016). 
23 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 63. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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belief in the merits of the [liberal] foundations upon which the Constitution is built.’24 These 
observations are instructive, particularly in light of Arato’s assertion that ‘each political 
community should determine its own constitution contextually, according to its own 
[social] needs … and political aspirations.’ 25  This means that the foundations of a 
constitution, as a close reading of Venter’s observation also reveals, are equally important 
insofar as determining whether the Constitution was crafted according to the will of the 
people. In other words, the foundation of the constitution is important in determining 
whether the people are governing in a particular regime. 
I must, however, point out here that the reference to the observations of Van der Walt, 
Venter and Arato does not necessarily mean that I concur with their thinking with regard 
to the concept of constituent power, the Constitution and South Africa’s constitution-
making process. For example, I don’t align myself with Arato’s advocacy of the premium 
role and the important parts played by courts during the constitution-making process.26 
My submission is that the advocacy of this feature of the post-sovereign constitution-
making model was, as we shall see, at the expense of the political unity of the people as 
the subject of constituent power. The observations which I just referred to are nonetheless 
very instructive. What I will do here is to evaluate these observations in the milieu of 
Schmitt and Colon-Rios’ non-normative thinking of constituent power (or the constitution-
making power) and the constitution. I posit as the root cause of the problems faced by 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy the normativist and liberal foundation of the 
                                                          
24 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 63. 
25 Arato A ‘Multi-track constitutionalism beyond Carl Schmitt’ (2011) Volume 18(3) Constellations 324. 
26 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 26(1) 
SAJHR 44. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Constitution, which initiated the restrictive normative regulation of constituent power and, 
therefore, the exercise of the political will of the people. 
Prempeh instructively argues that ‘[t]he democratic and liberal openings in Africa will 
continue to require consistent and persistent nurturing, correction and progressive 
reform.'27 He further points out that ‘[t]he inevitable need for additional reform, once the 
transition has "settled," should, in fact, counsel against the writing of rigid constitutions 
during fluid moments of democratic transition [and political eruptions].’28 Noteworthy also 
is the fact that in Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of 
Constituent power (henceforth Weak Constitutionalism), Colon-Rios makes the same 
instructive assertions. He, for example, asserts that democracy at the level of 
fundamental laws is against the objective of fixing in place a constitutional regime with a 
perpetual constitution, that is, a constitutional regime that hinders both the democratic 
exercise of constituent power by the people and the popular participation of the people in 
the constitution and re-constitution of the polity.29 In other words, Colon-Rios argues, ‘a 
constitutional regime should have a democratic pedigree and … it must not close the door 
to the future re-emergence of constituent power.’30  
Cognisant of the observations of Prempeh and Colon-Rios, which I just referred to, 
and the fact that South Africa emerged from an acrimonious epoch characterised by 
                                                          
27 Prempeh H K “Africa's "constitutionalism revival": False start or new dawn?’ (2007) 5 Int J of Constitutional Law 
506. 
28 Prempeh H K “Africa's "constitutionalism revival": False start or new dawn?’ (2007) 5 Int J of Constitutional Law 
506. (Emphasis in the original). 
29 Colon-Rios J Chapter 1 - Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power  
 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers (2012) 6. 
30 Colon-Rios J Chapter 1 - Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power  
 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers (2012) 11. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
   9 
 
violence, abject poverty and loss of life, a revolution is not an attractive option to consider 
in an endeavour to initiate and strengthen the democratic exercise of constituent power 
by the people. The most viable approach in trying to solve the problems and challenges 
faced by South Africa’s constitutional democracy is a non-normative approach to the 
Constitution and constitutionalism. A non-normative approach to the Constitution and 
constitutionalism is an approach that is in line with Schmitt and Colon-Rios’ thinking of 
democracy. As we shall see in Section 2, Schmitt’s arguments in respect of constituent 
power and the constitution reveal that the founding of a constitution is not a normative 
exercise but the manifestation of the will of the people. In the same vein, Colon-Rios 
emphasises that it is equally important for constitutional regimes to pay attention to ‘the 
second dimension of democracy [which] is not about the daily workings of the state’s 
political apparatus, but about the relation of citizens to their constitution.’31 According to 
Colon-Rios, the second dimension of democracy ‘looks at how a constitutional regime 
came into existence and how it can be altered.’32 In fact, a close reading of Colon-Rios’ 
Weak Constitutionalism reveals that even though the problems faced by South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy manifest at the level of daily governance, they originate and 
relate to democracy at the level of fundamental laws, that is, to the manner in which the 
Constitution was crafted. This will be the context of my argument in Section 1.4 when I 
outline scholarly contributions to reflections on South Africa’s constitution-making process 
and the resultant constitutional democracy. The arguments I will put forward in 
                                                          
31 Colon-Rios J Chapter 1 - Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power  
 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers (2012) 6. 
32 Colon-Rios J Chapter 1 - Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power  
 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers (2012) 6. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Section 1.4 will be carried through to Section 3 where I will discuss how the question of 
constituent power was handled in South Africa during the constitution-making process.  
The non-normative approach to the Constitution and constitutionalism entails the 
creation of an opening for popular democratic initiatives by the people, which are currently 
obscured by the notion of constitutionally regulated public participation initiatives. The 
advantage of popular democratic initiatives as compared to the constitutionally regulated 
public participation initiatives stems from the fact that the latter comprise of a top-down 
approach, in the sense that the national legislatures (the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces) and provincial legislatures are compelled by the 
Constitution to engage in public participation processes.33 It is also argued by some that 
public participation initiatives sanctioned by the legislatures and the executive encounter 
numerous problems and do not necessarily realise their fundamental objective, i.e., 
governance by the people. For example, Buccus and Hicks argue that ‘citizen 
participation is often reduced to participation by the elite, organised civil society, in the 
form of predominantly non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business and other 
interest groups with access to resources.’34  I am not, however, arguing that public 
participation processes are not an important feature of democracy or that they should be 
discontinued. In view of the observation by Buccus and Hicks, and in line with Colon-Rios’ 
thinking, I argue instead that more space must be accorded to popular democratic 
                                                          
33 Sections 59, 72 and 118 of the Constitution stipulate that the national legislatures and provincial legislature must 
facilitate public involvement in their legislative and other processes.   
34 Hicks J and Buccus I ‘Crafting new democratic spaces: participatory policy-making in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’ 
(2007) Project Muse Scholarly Journals Online 97. 
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initiatives, outside the confines of the Constitution and government institutions, to ensure 
the democratic exercise of constituent power by the people.  
Popular democratic initiatives are people-driven initiatives such as the collection of 
signatures, referendums (not government-initiated, but those that result from the 
collection of signatures), izimbizos 35  and Constituent Assemblies. The number and 
frequency of the people-driven democratic initiatives cannot be limited and is dependent 
on political circumstances which the people must decide upon. The South African 
constitutional democracy and constitutional discourse must provide a conducive 
environment for the people to be able to initiate the mooted processes themselves and in 
their own way, to address fundamental issues such as constitutional transformation. It is 
in this way, to use Colon-Rios’ turn of phrase, that constitutions can claim to enjoy 
democratic legitimacy, that they can be considered the creation of the people, their work-
in-progress, because they cannot only be changed and interpreted by those occupying 
positions of power.36  
The notion of Constituent Assemblies in this context needs to be clarified. Constituent 
Assemblies mooted here are, as Colon-Rios instructively observes, ‘[assemblies] which 
will be convened ‘from below’, triggered at the initiative of the citizenry [through the 
collection of signatures and calling of referendums] as opposed to [a Constituent 
Assembly initiated by key role players during the founding of a constitution after a regime 
                                                          
35 Government-initiated izimbizos focus on policy and daily governance matters, see Hicks J and Buccus I ‘Crafting 
new democratic spaces: participatory policy-making in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’ (2007) Project Muse Scholarly 
Journals Online 103. The izimbizos mooted here will be constituent assemblies that are initiated by the people and 
are precursors to the major constitution-making Constituent Assembly.   
36 Colon-Rios J Chapter 1 - Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power  
 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers (2012) 1. 
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change or that which is initiated by] the legislature.’37 It is important to note that Colon-
Rios does not confine the role of a Constituent Assembly only to the initial constitution-
making episode that follows a regime change. He points out that a Constituent Assembly 
‘may facilitate the exercise of constituent power when [an existing] constitution is to be 
transformed in important ways.’38 He further maintains that a Constituent Assembly is a 
‘mechanism [that] is about recognising a power superior to the constitution [i.e. the 
constituent power of the people] and giving citizens, acting outside the ordinary 
institutions of government, the institutional means for exercising it.’39 Therefore, the non-
normative approach to the Constitution and constitutionalism mooted here, as it will be 
shown in Section 4, aims at the birth of a form of democratic constitutionalism that will 
enable a non-normative exercise of constituent power by the people. This democratic 
constitutionalism can, depending on the results of the popular democratic initiatives, lead 
to the amendment of the Constitution or the establishment of a new Constitution by the 
people themselves.  
 
1.3. Research questions 
The Constitution explicitly recognises that the authority of government rests on the will 
and consent of the people, hence the declaration ‘We, the people of South Africa’ in its 
preamble. Thus, the most important feature of the post-apartheid state seems to be the 
acknowledgement that the authority of the state and its continued existence depend on 
                                                          
37 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012) 161. 
38 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012) 153. 
39 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012) 161. 
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the constituent power and will of the people. However, can we claim that, in a truly 
democratic and non-normative sense, the people are governing in South Africa? In other 
words, is the democratic will of the people, as the subject of constituent power, the 
sovereign or the determining factor in South Africa’s constitutional democracy? Informed 
by Schmitt and Colon-Rios’ thinking of the constitution and democracy, my answer to this 
question is, as will be shown in the discussion that follows, in the negative. The next 
question is how the constituent power of the people can be recognised, both in practice 
and in constitutional discourse. 
To answer the question of whether the people are truly governing in South Africa, that 
is, whether the will of the people is sovereign in South Africa’s constitutional democracy, 
we need to look first at how the Constitution was crafted. Secondly, we need to look at 
possible ways that can mitigate the faultlines of the constitution-making process and, 
therefore, the challenges and maladies faced by South Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
It is my contention that a number of factors, as we shall see in Sections 2 and 3, militated 
against the crafting of the Constitution entirely according to the political will of the people, 
and place stumbling blocks in the way of the recognition of this power.  
As hinted at above, it is my contention that: (1) the persistent attack faced by South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy which originates from the diminishing hope in 
constitutionalism; (2) the illegal land occupations which signal the rejection of the property 
clause; and (3) the lack of change for the better of the socioeconomic conditions of the 
historically disadvantaged majority of the South African polity, underscore the need to 
strengthen both the foundation and the exercise of democratic constitutionalism in the 
South African context. This can only be addressed by a non-normative approach to the 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Constitution and constitutionalism. In other words, the South African constitutional 
discourse, as Colon-Rios instructively concludes with regard to democratic constitutions, 
‘must provide the means for constituent power to reappear … and, if needed, to put the 
entire institutional arrangement into question.’40 
 
1.4. Literature survey 
Instructive studies have been proffered by constitutional theory scholars on the issue of 
constituent power in relation to South Africa’s constitution-making process, the 
Constitution and current socioeconomic maladies. Perhaps the most notable among such 
studies are the ones that emanated from ‘the project [that] was designed by the 
formulation by Johan van der Walt of two pairs of inter-related questions linking political 
and constitutional theory.’ 41  The project sought to establish whether there was a 
connection between the current socio-political malaise and the constitution-writing 
process. It is my submission that the valuable observations made by the various authors 
in that project reveal not only that the Constitution was not determined entirely according 
to the political will of the people, but also that constitutional discourse in South Africa does 
not allow for this will to emerge.  
Arato is undoubtedly one of the prominent scholars who have made valuable 
contributions to reflections on South Africa’s constitution-making process and 
                                                          
40 Colon-Rios J Chapter 1 - ‘Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power’  
 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Papers (2012) 9. (My emphasis). 
41 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 45. 
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constitutional democracy. In fact,  Arato asserts that he has ‘often referred to, and … 
reconstructed, the South African constitution-making process as an exemplary 
implementation of the model of post-sovereign constitution-making [which he has] been 
developing in [his] work in recent years from a comparative theoretical, but also deeply 
politically committed, perspective.’ 42  In line with this assertion, in ‘Post-sovereign 
constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ Arato 
reflects on how the South African post-sovereign constitution-making process, in contrast 
to the Hungarian process, was successful because it perfected all the stages of the post-
sovereign constitution-making model.  
What is of significance to the question that we are seized with here is that the 
perfection of the process by South Africa entails, first, allowing the Constitutional Court a 
prominent role to police not only the procedural but also the substantive requirements of 
the constitution-making process and the Constitution itself, as stipulated by the 
Constitutional Principles that were contained in the Interim Constitution.43 Arato points 
out that ‘[t]he initial refusal of the South African Constitutional Court to certify (thus 
invalidating in effect) the final Constitution was extraordinary in this regard, but in line with 
the basic logic of the method.’44 Arato then attributes, albeit noncommittally, the failure of 
the Hungarian constitution-making process to the lack of this essential element, that is, 
the significant role of an effective constitutional court. Secondly, the success entails South 
Africa’s success in avoiding sovereign constitution-making that puts emphasis on the 
                                                          
42 Arato A ‘What I have learned: Concluding remarks’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 129. (Emphasis in the original) 
43 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 26(1) 
SAJHR 21. 
44 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 26(1) 
SAJHR 21. 
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notion of the sovereignty of the will of the people. In fact, Arato states categorically that 
‘the post sovereign constitution-making process of the post-sovereign model envisages 
no instance that can claim to represent in the absolute sense the sovereign will of the 
people.’45 He claims that according to the post-sovereign constitution-making process, 
the people can only be present ‘in a plural, complex and always limited way.’46  
In ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South 
Africa’s constitution-making experiment’ Botha interrogates two major arguments or 
interpretations that are proffered with regard to the relation between the constitution-
making process and the current socio-political maladies that are facing South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. Botha points out that the first argument is critical of South 
Africa’s constitution-making process. He claims that what is key about the first argument 
is the view that the ‘fragmentation of popular sovereignty and its reduction of constituent 
to constituted power have … come back to haunt South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy.’47 To be sure, as Van der Walt also points out, the first argument regards the 
South African constitution-making process as a failure.48 Botha then points out that ‘[t]he 
second [argument], by contrast, holds that public freedom was instituted precisely by 
splintering sovereignty, by undermining the supposed unity and identity of ‘the people’, 
                                                          
45 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 26(1) 
SAJHR 23. 
46 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 26(1) 
SAJHR 23. (My emphasis). 
47 Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s constitution-
making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 66. 
48 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 103. 
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by affirming plurality, and by subjecting all power (including the power of the Constitutional 
Assembly) to the demand for justification.’49  
It is important to note that the second argument that Botha refers to is the antithesis 
of what the analysis undertaken here argues for, particularly with regard to the 
sovereignty of the people. According to this argument, the assumption of collective 
selfhood or the notion of the people who could undertake the sovereign exercise of 
constituent power is problematic in the South African context. 50  According to this 
argument, the South African constitution-making process, by allowing the supposed self-
presence and sovereignty of the people to be interrupted and challenged, placed 
indeterminacy, plurality and questionability at the very heart of the new polity.51 I will 
return to this argument in Section 3, particularly in respect of the notion of pluralism vis-
à-vis the political unity of the people.  
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to consider the crosscutting analysis proffered by Van 
der Walt in ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A 
case of competing retroactivities’. Fundamentally, Van der Walt’s argument is aligned to 
the arguments of Arato in terms of being an ‘articulation of the essential “plurality of the 
political” and “plurality of constitutionalism” that the renunciation of apartheid must take 
as its regulative ideal.’52 In other words, Van der Walt advocates a pluralistic thinking of 
                                                          
49 Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s constitution-
making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 73. 
50 Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s constitution-
making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 75. 
51 Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s constitution-
making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 78. 
52 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 104. 
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the political and constitutionalism, as opposed to the sovereignty of the people as the 
subject of constituent power. This is evident in at least two arguments that Van der Walt 
advances.  
First, Van der Walt argues that pluralism also entails ‘accepting and living with 
irreducible differences between the people that are united by a system of law.’53 Of 
significance to the analysis undertaken here is that this is the antithesis, as Van der Walt 
himself refers to it, of ‘Schmitt’s understanding of the political in terms of the unity of 
sovereignty.’ 54  Secondly, Van der Walt’s support of the post-sovereign constitution-
making model is premised on his observation that the model is influenced by Arendt’s 
dualistic understanding of the constitution-making process, ‘in terms of which the process 
“always” remains “under law” ... and ... constitutes no complete revolutionary rupture with 
the past, ... thus endors[ing] a dualism of constitutional continuity and legislative 
change.’55 According to Van der Walt, dualism relates to the fact that the South African 
constitution-making process ‘constitutes no complete revolutionary rupture with the past, 
despite the fundamentally new constitutional order that the process creates and 
inaugurates.’56  I will discuss further the notion of dualism in Section 3 when I deal with 
the notion of constitutional continuity. I will show that constitutional continuity or dualism 
in the South African context was a normative fiction perpetuated to limit the democratic 
                                                          
53 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 115. 
54 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 112. 
55 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 111. 
56 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
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concept of the sovereignty of the will of the people and to safeguard the interests of 
monopoly capital.  
Another scholar who makes important observations about the current socio-political 
maladies in relation to South Africa’s constitution-making process is Venter in his article 
‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution-writing 
propelled by the winds of globalisation.’ In this article, Venter makes a very informative 
analysis of the question whether the apparent deterioration of South African 
constitutionalism is to be ascribed to the manner in which the Constitution was written.57 
One of the fundamental issues that Venter regards as crucial in such an analysis is the 
attitude of the main role-players in the constitution-writing process, the NP and the ANC, 
which had a bearing on what Venter refers to as ‘the unlikely conversion’ of South Africa 
into a liberal constitutional democracy.  
There are at least two issues in Venter’s analysis which are of significance to the 
analysis undertaken here. First, a close reading of Venter’s account hints at the 
connection between the need on the part of the National Party government to safeguard 
the interests of the minority white South African population 58  and the Record of 
Understanding which laid the foundation for the legally binding Constitutional Principles. 
According to Venter, the negotiations process and constitution-making process actually 
proceeded after the deadlock of CODESA 1 according to the recommendations of the 
                                                          
57 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 45.  
58 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 52. 
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National Party government. 59  These recommendations, which in essence are the 
characteristic tenets of the post-sovereign constitution-making model, resulted in 
‘CODESA ... and Parliament as constituted at the time, jointly exercis[ing] the pouvoir 
constituant.’ 60  Secondly, Venter’s account reflects on the influence of global liberal 
constitutionalism that was predominant in the 20th century on South Africa’s constitution-
making process.61 In fact, Venter claims that the Constitutional Principles ‘represented 
the epitome of late 20th century constitutionalism in the liberal democratic mode.’62  
Thus, the influence of global liberal constitutionalism on South Africa’s transition to a 
constitutional democracy cannot be gainsaid. And my contention is that there is a 
fundamental link between global liberal constitutionalism and Kelsen’s legal positivism 
(normativism). In fact, the South African constitution-making process demonstrated the 
fundamental hallmark of legal positivism, namely the emphasis on the priority of law 
(normative or legal regulation) as opposed to the emphasis on the priority of the 
constituent power of the people in the form of, for example, a sovereign Constituent 
Assembly. This link will become clear when I flesh out in the following section (as hinted 
at above) the philosophical debate about the question of priority or the tension between 
constituent power and the law (or the constitution).  
 
                                                          
59 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
globalisation’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 53. 
60 Venter F ‘Liberal democracy: The unintended consequence. South African constitution propelled by the winds of 
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1.5. Section outline 
The structure of the analysis undertaken here is as follows: Section 2 will outline further 
the background to the tension between the concept of constituent power and the 
constitution (or law) in constitutional discourse. I will elucidate the salient philosophical 
arguments that pertain to this tension, thereby highlighting the influence of normativism 
on South Africa’s constitutional discourse. The influence that normativism has over South 
Africa’s constitutional discourse is with regard to the concept of the basic norm and the 
emphasis on the priority of law. The milieu of the discussion of the influence of 
normativism on South Africa’s constitutional discourse will be the three schools of 
thought, namely decisionism (Schmitt), normativism (Kelsen) and relationalism (Lindahl).  
In Section 3 I will explore how the question of the concept of constituent power has 
been dealt with in South Africa. The aim in this section is to evaluate whether, in a truly 
democratic and non-normativist sense, the South African constitution-making process did 
ensure that the Constitution was determined contextually, that is, whether the foundation 
was properly laid to ensure that the people shall govern. I will do this by discussing the 
notion of constitutional continuity, pluralism and the concept of the people.  
Section 4 will focus on how to re-establish a meaningful role of the people as the 
subject of constituent power in a truly non-normative and democratic sense. This section 
will highlight the tension between rigid constitutionalism and democracy as explicated by 
Colon-Rios. The discussion in this section will show how Colon-Rios’ concept of 
democracy at the level of fundamental laws is more relevant in the South African context, 
particularly with regard to ensuring that the people are governing. This section will also 
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flesh out the notion of people-driven (democratic) initiatives in South Africa. Section 5 will 
conclude with a summary of the salient arguments that are proffered in the analysis 
undertaken here. 
 
2. CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION  
Let me now turn to the debate pertaining to the tension between the concept of constituent 
power and the constitution. It is acknowledged by some that at the heart of the modern 
conceptualisation of the dilemma of constituent power and the constitution is the Schmitt-
Kelsen debate.63 It is my submission that Kelsen’s arguments in this debate resonate with 
the dominant arguments in the South African constitutional discourse, both during the 
constitution-making process and currently. Fundamentally, in this debate Kelsen 
advocates the pure theory of law and the notion of the constitution as a norm of norms 
deriving from the basic norm. Schmitt, on the other hand, advocates the concept of a 
concretely present people as a political unity,64 ‘whose power or authority is capable of 
making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the type and form of its own political 
existence.’65 On this basis, the debate is characterised by constitutional theory scholars 
as a debate between decisionism and normativism.  
In grappling with this debate, constitutional theory scholars posit various arguments 
and concepts to show their agreement or disagreement with either Schmitt or Kelsen or 
                                                          
63 See, for example, Lindahl H ‘Acquiring a community: The Acquis and the Institution of European Legal Order’ (2003) 
The European Law Journal 9 (4).  
64 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 255. 
65 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 125.  
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both. Arguing in favour of a decisionist approach to the Constitution, I will also reflect on 
what other constitutional theory scholars (for example, Loughlin, Dyzenhaus and Lindahl) 
have written about the arguments of the two authors. The aim is to highlight the basis 
why, as a result of the influence of normativism (and global liberal constitutionalism), it is 
difficult to claim that the people are able to freely and democratically exercise their 
constituent power in the South African constitutional discourse. I submit that it is only 
when the Constitution is determined as the decision of the people that we can say the 
people are governing in a truly democratic sense. 
 
2.1. Normativism 
In his article, ‘The concept of constituent power’, Loughlin identifies two variants of 
normativism, namely the anti-positivist variant and the positivist variant. Loughlin points 
out that the positivist variant of normativism ‘either assumes the existence of a sovereign 
or else a concept of law as a system of norms authorized by some founding norm whose 
authority is pre-supposed.’66 He claims that the anti-positivist variant, on the other hand, 
‘focuses on the moral evolution of legality as a social practice but avoids saying anything 
about the political conditions under which constitutional authority is established.’ 67 
According to Loughlin, the central thesis of the two variants of normativism is that 
constituent power either belongs to the world of myth (the positivist variant)68  or is 
                                                          
66 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 223. 
67 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 223. 
68 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 222. 
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redundant (the anti-positivist variant).69 Let us first consider the anti-positivist variant of 
normativism. 
 
2.1.1. The anti-positivist variant 
Loughlin claims that the anti-positivist school of thought maintains that ‘legality is a moral 
practice of subjecting official conduct to the governance of principles and values that 
make up an ideal [normativist] vision of law.’70 He argues that the anti-positivist variant of 
normativism conceives law ‘as an overarching structure of principles [that governs and 
regulates] all forms of human conduct … and the acquisition and generation of political 
power is regarded as intrinsically moral rather than political.’71 According to the anti-
positivist variant of normativism, political power rests not on the constituent power of the 
people but on ‘a morality of law which promotes certain (intrinsically good) legal values.’72 
Theorists of the anti-positivist variant of normativism, therefore, reject the concept of a 
decision by the people which is presented as the ultimate authority of a legal–
constitutional order because, they argue, ‘this yields a distorted image of the authority of 
‘government under law’.73  
                                                          
69 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 222. 
70 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 223. 
71 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 223. 
72 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 223. 
73 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 222. 
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Dyzenhaus is one of the proponents of the anti-positivist school of thought.74 For 
Dyzenhaus, ‘law’s authority [is founded] on the intrinsic [good] qualities of legal order.’75 
Dyzenhaus emphasises that it is the intrinsically good legal values that afford the law its 
authority. He further claims that the ‘qualities and authority [of law] are moral as well as 
legal, and thus explain why law’s claim to authority is justified.’76 In this context, Loughlin 
instructively observes that, according to Dyzenhaus, ‘legality is basic in a way that 
“constitution”, let alone constituent power, is not.’77 In fact, Dyzenhaus claims that the 
normative legal theory which he outlines in his article ‘The Question of Constituent Power’ 
is basically about ‘showing how legal order and law itself are best understood from the 
inside, from a participant perspective that argues that legal order has intrinsic qualities 
that help to sustain an attractive and viable conception of political community.’78 He claims 
that according to the normative legal theory the question of constituent power does not 
arise.79  
The thinking of the priority of law’s authority, particularly the thinking of law’s 
intrinsically good values, can be seen as having had an influence on the South African 
constitution-making process. It is my submission that this thinking lies at the basis of the 
declaration in the founding provisions of the Constitution that the South African state is 
founded, amongst other values, on the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
                                                          
74 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 222. 
75  Dyzenhaus D ‘Constitutionalism in an old key: Legality and constituent power’ (2012) Vol. 1, (2) Global 
Constitutionalism 233. 
76  Dyzenhaus D ‘Constitutionalism in an old key: Legality and constituent power’ (2012) Vol. 1, (2) Global 
Constitutionalism 233. 
77 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 222. 
78  Dyzenhaus D ‘Constitutionalism in an old key: Legality and constituent power’ (2012) Vol. 1, (2) Global 
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As we shall see in Section 3, the thinking of the authority of law and law’s intrinsically 
good qualities are imbedded in concepts and notions such as, for example, constitutional 
or legal continuity, properly enacted legal authority, and the Constitutional Principles. 
Thus, the judicialisation of the constitution-making process in South Africa can be seen 
as being informed by the anti-positivist claim that legality is basic vis-à-vis the 
mythological concept of constituent power.  
I must point out here that Dyzenhaus’ anti-positivist claim to the overarching principle 
of legality, as Loughlin observes, is a claim to ‘the rule of law’, which is premised on the 
integrity of legal ordering. In other words, as Loughlin points out, the anti-positivist claim 
is actually a claim ‘to a “higher law behind the law” [and a rejection] of the concept of 
constituent power on the ground that it remains tied to the status of an enacted 
constitution whose author is an entity known as “the people”.’80 What comes to the fore 
here is that the anti-positivist school of thought erroneously perceives legality and legal 
(and constitutional) authority as self-generating and self-empowering. Loughlin 
instructively points out in this regard that ‘the practice of legality rests on political 
conditions it cannot itself guarantee.’81 The observation by Loughlin that legality cannot 
guarantee prevailing political conditions is all the more the reason that the South African 
constitutional discourse must undergo fundamental change to enable a non-normative 
exercise of constituent power by the people.    
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2.1.2. The positivist variant 
According to Loughlin legal positivism is best illustrated in Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’.82 
Kelsen’s pure theory of law, as we have seen with the anti-positivist variant, entails as its 
methodological basis ‘attempts to eliminate from [the description of law] everything that 
is not strictly law.’83 Kelsen maintains that law is a science that should not be interpreted 
according to what is external to it, for example, psychology, political theory, sociology, 
and so on. The reason according to Kelsen is that ‘what turns [an] event into a legal or an 
illegal act is not … determined by [something outside law or the] laws of causality 
prevailing in nature, but the objective meaning resulting from its [legal] interpretation.’84 
Kelsen posits a presupposed basic norm which ‘confers legal meaning to the act … [and 
also] functions as a scheme of interpretation.’85 In other words, Kelsen’s scheme of 
interpretation, or chain of authorisation, has at the apex a presupposed basic norm or a 
Grundnorm, which is the original constitution and from which the lower norms derive their 
authority.86  
In fact, for Kelsen, the basic norm is the origin and matrix of law. Consider, for 
example, Kelsen’s thinking of the reason for the validity of a norm. Kelsen’s legal 
positivism, as a science of positive law, ‘limits itself to a question of validity … [and] 
eliminate[s] all questions concerning the relationship between legality and legitimacy.’87 
Kelsen submits that a norm is valid if it is enacted by a competent entity or norm creator 
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83 Kelsen H The Pure Theory of Law (1967) 1. 
84 Kelsen H The Pure Theory of Law (1967) 3-4. 
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upon whom a higher norm bestowed the authority to create norms.88 The higher norm 
that bestows authority on the entity or personality is itself based on a presupposed basic 
norm. The presupposed basic norm, Kelsen argues, is the last and highest norm and its 
validity cannot be questioned because it cannot be posited.89 Kelsen points out that this 
basic norm cannot be posited in the sense that it cannot be ‘created … by an authority 
whose competence would have to rest on a still higher norm.’90 This means that norms 
are hierarchically related. The higher norm authorises the lower norm, and the latter 
cannot be in conflict with the former. 
What is also significant to note with regard to Kelsen’s legal positivism is that ‘a legal 
norm is not valid because it has a certain content … but because it is created … ultimately 
in a way determined by a presupposed basic norm.’91 According to Kelsen, a norm is valid 
based on the validity of the higher norm.92 This is what Kelsen defines as the dynamic 
aspect of law, as opposed to the static aspect of law which holds that for a norm to be 
valid its content must be in conformity with the content of a basic norm.93 What is key to 
the dynamic aspect of law is the procedure which determines the validity of the norm, the 
statute or the constitution, as the case may be. This can be illustrated with reference to 
Kelsen’s normative scheme of interpretation as follows: ‘That an assembly of people is a 
parliament, and that the meaning of their act is a statute, results from the conformity of all 
these facts with the norms laid down in the constitution.’94 In other words, the act of 
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89 Kelsen H The Pure Theory of Law (1967) 194-5. 
90 Kelsen H The Pure Theory of Law (1967) 195. 
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parliament is interpreted as a statute because it is executed according to a procedure 
determined by norms laid down in the constitution.  
Of particular interest to the analysis undertaken here is a scenario where the meaning 
of the act is a constitution in the context of a national legal order. Kelsen points out that if 
a constitution existed before the one that is being founded, the one being founded may 
be determined according to the rules of the former constitution by way of constitutional 
amendment.95 If the validity of the former constitution is questioned, Kelsen says that ‘we 
eventually arrive at a historically first constitution that … cannot be traced back to a 
positive norm created by a legal authority.’ 96 Kelsen argues that the historically first 
constitution may have become ‘valid in a revolutionary way, that is, either by breach of a 
former constitution or for a territory that formerly was not the sphere of validity of a 
constitution and of a national legal order based on it.’97 In other words, as Lindahl also 
observes,98 Kelsen acknowledges that the historically first constitution is a manifestation 
of power that is not legally authorised.  
According to Kelsen, however, for the constitution that was created in a revolutionary 
way to be regarded as binding, its validity must be presupposed as a basic norm because 
the validity of a norm can only be another norm. In this sense, both the subject (the 
constituent power) and the act of constitution-making (the procedure) are incorporated 
within legal positivist parameters. Noteworthy is the fact that the content of the constitution 
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and of the national legal order created is, for Kelsen, irrelevant when a basic norm is 
presupposed with reference to the constitution.99 I will in Section 3 refer to Kelsen’s 
concept of the basic norm in the context of its influence on the South African post-
sovereign constitution-making process. 
 
2.2. Decisionism 
Decisionism is associated with Schmitt. In contradistinction to Kelsen’s pure theory of law, 
Schmitt states that a constitution ‘originates from an act of the constitution-making 
power’.100 He asserts that to view a constitution as a norm of norms signifies ‘a unified, 
closed system of higher and ultimate laws.’101 To view a constitution as a norm of norms 
is, for Schmitt, the characterisation of a constitution in an absolutist sense, and, instead 
of a political unity, ‘the state becomes a legal order that rests on the constitution as basic 
norm.’102  Schmitt argues that ‘the unity and order [of the state] lies in [its] political 
existence, not in statutes ... [and] ideas and terms that speak of the constitution as “basic 
law” are for the most part ... imprecise.’103 For Schmitt, the unity and order of the state 
rests on the political unity, i.e., the relative homogeneity of the people that is dependent 
on some sense of solidarity. The sense of solidarity allows the state to protect itself 
against other external political unities. As Böckenförde notes, when Schmitt speaks of the 
state as a political unity he means that the state is constituted of domestic distinctions, 
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antagonisms, and conflicts which however remain below the level of friend-enemy-
groupings. 104 
It is important to note that Schmitt makes a distinction between the constitution and 
constitutional laws or statutes. For Schmitt, the constitution is the political decision about 
the form and nature of the existence of the people which is normally contained in the 
preamble or founding provisions of the constitution.105 To illustrate this in the case of 
South Africa, we can refer to s 1(c) of the Constitution wherein it is stated that ‘[t]he 
Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the … supremacy 
of the constitution and the rule of law.’ According to Schmitt, this type of provision is not 
a constitutional law but part of the constitution as such, that is, a political decision that the 
people have reached about the form and nature of their existence. In other words, the 
people of South Africa, through their constitution-making will, have reached a decision 
that they will exist as a democratic republic based on the rule of law.  
Constitutional laws, on the other hand, are statutory regulations that have been 
incorporated into the constitution. 106  There are many examples of such statutory 
regulations in the Constitution. For example, it is clear that the purpose of s 37(6) of the 
Constitution is to regulate the detention of persons under a state of emergency.107 There 
is no question that the incorporation of s 37(6) into the Constitution is informed by a desire 
not to have a repeat of the tragic experiences that befell numerous political detainees and 
                                                          
104 Böckenförde E ‘The concept of the political: A key to understanding Carl Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory’(1997) 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. X, No.1. 6-7. 
105 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 77.  
106 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 67. 
107 Section 37(6)(a), for example, states that ‘[w]henever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a 
derogation of rights resulting from a declaration of a state of emergency, … [a]n adult family member or friend of 
the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained.’  
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prisoners during the apartheid era in South Africa. 108  Schmitt argues that such 
formalisation of individual provisions results in the relegation of fundamental provisions 
(for example s 1 of the Constitution) to the level of constitutional law.109 Evidently, s 1 of 
the Constitution is of ultimate importance as compared to s 37(6) of the Constitution. This 
is evidenced, for example, by the fact that the amendment of the fundamental decision 
contained in s 1 requires extraordinary majorities as compared to any other constitutional 
provision. The phrase ‘any other’ in s 74(3) implies a hierarchy of the provisions of the 
Constitution. Schmitt points out that as a result of the formalisation of constitutional law(s) 
‘[t]he constitution (as unity) and constitutional law (as detail) are tacitly rendered 
equivalent and confused with one another.’110  
Schmitt asserts that, ‘[a] constitution originates from an act of the constitution-making 
power [and] such a constitution is a conscious decision, which the political unity reaches 
for itself and provides itself through the bearer of the constitution-making power.’111 In a 
dynastic state, the bearer of the constitution-making power is the king. Therefore, the 
political unity in such a state form reaches the decision about its form and type of 
existence through the king as the constitution-making power. But, in the case of a 
democracy, Schmitt maintains that the bearer of constitution-making power is the people. 
This, therefore, means that in a democratic state the people reach the decision for 
themselves through their own will. In other words, the people ‘grant themselves their 
                                                          
108 Numerous political detainees and prisoners like Bathandwa Ndondo were detained, murdered or made to 
disappear by the security forces of the then apartheid government’s security forces. See 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/bathandwa-ndondo (Accessed on 13 February 2016)   
109 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 68. 
110 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 68. 
111 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 76.  
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constitution’112 according to their own political will and aspirations. The people is the 
subject of constitution-making power, ‘with the will to establish a constitution’113 and 
‘capable of acting.114 Schmitt here makes the point that the constitution-making power is 
an existing political being, hence the emphasis on its capability to will and to act.  
To illustrate the concept of the presupposed political unity as a concretely present 
people capable of acting, Schmitt refers to the philosophical arguments of Sieyès during 
the French Revolution of 1789.115 Sieyès is the thinker who is most often associated with 
the concept of the constituent power of the people.116 In ‘What is the Third Estate?’ Sieyès 
categorically argues that ‘the nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin of 
everything.’117 In other words, in this instructive tract, Sieyès asserts ‘a revolutionary 
conception of national sovereignty with radical political implications.’118 The most salient 
of those implications is that he presents the people as the bearer or subject of constituent 
power.  
Schmitt points out that, during the French Revolution of 1789, Sieyès ‘developed the 
theory of the people (more precisely the nation) as the subject of the constitution-making 
power.’119 According to Schmitt, attempts during the French Revolution of 1789 to have 
                                                          
112 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 255. 
113 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 75. (Emphasis added) 
114 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 75. (Emphasis added) 
115 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 126. 
116  Oklopcic Z ‘Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign peoples, new constituent powers, and the formation of 
constitutional orders in the Balkans’ (2012) 19 (1) Constellations 91. 
See also Loughlin M Foundations of Public Law (2010) Oxford University Press 224.  
117 Sieyès ‘What is the Third Estate’ in Baker K M, Boyer J W & Kirshner J (eds) The Old Regime and the French 
Revolution (1987) 7. 
118 Baker K M, Boyer J W & Kirshner J (eds) The Old Regime and the French Revolution (1987) 6. 
119 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 126. (Emphasis in original) 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
   34 
 
the king as the representative of the people’s will did not succeed.120 He points out that 
the French people ‘took its destiny into its own hands and reached a free decision on the 
type and form of its political existence.’121 For Schmitt, the case of the French Revolution 
of 1789 illustrates that the constitution derives from a single instance of decision by the 
people as a concretely existing subject of the constitution-making power. This decision 
determines the entirety of the political unity in regard to its peculiar form of existence.122 
So, according to Schmitt, the constitution rests on the authority of the people as the 
subject of constituent power. 
Schmitt also proffers illuminating arguments in respect of the legitimacy and validity 
of a constitution. He states categorically that a constitution is not legitimate because it 
‘originated according to previously valid constitutional laws.’123 According to Schmitt, a 
constitution is valid because it is based on the people’s constitution-making power. 
Schmitt argues that a new constitution, that is, a new fundamental decision, cannot 
subordinate itself to a previous constitution.124 With regard to the question of validity, 
Schmitt argues that, ‘[f]or its validity as a normative regulation, every law, even 
constitutional law, ultimately needs a political decision that is prior to it, a decision that is 
reached by a [constituent] power or authority that exists politically.’125 The constitution-
making power is a political will and the decision that it reaches defines the existence of 
the political unity in its totality.126 According to Schmitt, therefore, the validity of the 
                                                          
120 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 129. 
121 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 127. 
122 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 75. (Emphasis in the original) 
123 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 136. 
124 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 136. 
125 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 76. (Emphasis is in the original) 
126 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 125. 
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constitution is based on the ‘existing political will of that which establishes it … [and] … 
constitutional law presupposes that such a will already exists.’127 In contradistinction to 
what is argued by Kelsen, Schmitt here makes the point that constitutional validity is not 
self-generating through retrospective attribution to the basic norm. Constitutional validity 
according to Schmitt rests on the unmediated political will of the people.128 He points out 
that, ‘the constitution-making will of the people … exists prior to and above every 
constitutional [norm and] procedure.’129  
In light of the arguments of Schmitt (and Colon-Rios as hinted at above and will be 
further illustrated in Section 4) as outlined above, it is clear that the South African 
Constitution was determined in the milieu of the strong influence of normativism. First, s 
1(c) of the Constitution entrenches, among other values, the supremacy and priority of 
the Constitution and the law, instead of the political will of the people. Thus, in a 
remarkable twist of allegiance, the political declaration contained in the preamble that the 
Constitution is the creation of the people through their freely elected representatives is 
jettisoned in s 1(c). The Constitution in s 1(c) attains authority which, in a manner 
evocative of the thinking of Kelsen and Dyzenhaus, becomes basic in a way that the will 
of the people is not. The observation that the Constitution’s authority becomes basic more 
than the will of the people is further evinced by s 42(3), wherein it is stated that even the 
National Assembly that is elected to represent the people must ensure government by 
the people under the Constitution.130 Secondly, s 2 of the Constitution states that ‘[the] 
                                                          
127 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 76. (Emphasis is in the original) 
128 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 132. 
129 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 132. 
130 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’131 Yet again, the Constitution, 
and thus the South African constitutional discourse, displays an elective affinity for 
normativism which, as we have seen, is not compatible with the notion of the will of the 
people.  
 
2.3. Relationalism 
Loughlin identifies relationalism as the third type of legal thought that grapples with the 
question of constituent power vis-à-vis the founding or the constitution of a polity. 
Loughlin’s explication of relationalism is largely fashioned on Lindahl’s analysis of the 
ambiguous nature of the foundational moment of a polity, precisely self-constitution.132 
Indeed, Lindahl makes profound observations in respect of the paradoxical relationship 
of constituent power and constituted power, particularly in his comparative analysis of 
Kelsen and Schmitt,133 as well as Kelsen and Arendt.134 The main thesis of Lindahl’s 
analysis of the paradoxical relationship of constituted power and constituent power is that 
the ambiguous self-constitution of a polity is both a moment of constitution by and of a 
collective self.135 Lindahl’s relationalist theory illuminates key conceptual issues regarding 
                                                          
131 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
132 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 222. 
133 See Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin 
W & Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008). 
134 See Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 
Ratio Juris 20(4). 
135 See Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin 
W & Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 10 and Lindahl 
H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) Ratio Juris 
20(4) 486. (Emphasis in original) 
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collective agency, identity, attribution, representation and democracy. But importantly, 
Lindahl’s arguments reveal, as hinted at above and as we will yet again see, the 
incompatibility of normativism with democracy as a mode of being or identity of a political 
community. I will first outline Lindahl’s analyses of Kelsen’s pure theory of law and 
Schmitt’s decisionism. I will then conclude this section with a summative assessment that 
will deal with Lindahl’s pivotal objections to Schmitt’s decisionist arguments, which relate 
to the analysis undertaken here.  
 
2.3.1. Relationalism and the pure theory of law 
According to Lindahl, Kelsen’s analysis of constituent power is premised on an indirect 
and regressive approach, i.e., instead of confronting constituent power directly, Kelsen 
concerns himself with understanding constituted power. 136  Lindahl argues that, as a 
result, Kelsen’s analysis of collective agency translates into the question: Under what 
conditions can the act of an individual be interpreted as the act of a collective?137 In his 
reading of Kelsen’s analysis of the state as an acting subject, Lindahl observes that the 
crux of Kelsen’s argument is that from a legal perspective it is impossible to conceive of 
legislation or norm-creation as an act of a collective other than through the acts of 
constituted power.138 Lindahl observes that, for Kelsen, ‘the key to constituted power is 
                                                          
136 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin W & 
Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 10. 
137 See Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin 
W & Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 10 and Lindahl 
H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 20(4) Ratio 
Juris 487. 
138 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin W & 
Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 11 & 19. 
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the attribution of the act of an individual to a collective.’139 He further notes that attribution 
allows Kelsen to link constituted power to representation,140 because ‘to say that the act 
of an individual is attributed to a collective is another way of saying that the individual 
represents a collective.’141 In other words, the individual or the state organ engages in an 
act on behalf of the collective or the state. 
Lindahl agrees with Kelsen that the law only understands collective agency when it 
is exercised through constituted power and in conformity with itself (the law).142 He points 
out that, according to Kelsen, the action of an individual or constituted power is 
regressively attributed to the state in order to link the act of norm-creation to the basic 
norm (the Grundnorm) that authorises it.143 The association of the act of the individual 
with the state then translates into the empowerment of the individual by the law because 
the act is thereby authorised by the Grundnorm. On this basis, Lindahl observes that 
Kelsen’s analysis centres on a regressive pattern: ‘One moves from the act of norm-
creation to the norm that authorises it, and so on.’144  
                                                          
139 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin W & 
Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 11. (Emphasis in 
original) 
140 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin W & 
Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 11. (Emphasis in 
original) 
141 Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 
20(4) Ratio Juris 487. 
142 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 11 
143 See Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin 
M & Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 11 and 
Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 20(4) 
Ratio Juris 488. 
144 Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 
20(4) Ratio Juris 488. 
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Lindahl makes it clear that Kelsen’s chain of authorisation is not infinite as it reveals 
that ‘relations of empowerment lead back to a “first constitution” enacted by an assembly 
or an individual … [that] cannot be empowered to do so by a norm of positive law.’145 
However, even though Kelsen acknowledges that the act of will which gives rise to a novel 
legal order is not mediated by legal forms, he emphasises, as alluded to earlier, that this 
act has to always be in conformity with law. Kelsen’s insistence on collapsing collective 
subjectivity into the legal order is problematic because, as Lindahl points out, in the 
process of enacting the first constitution, the (unauthorised) individual or assembly 
simultaneously establishes itself according to the very constitution it enacts. Lindahl 
claims that Kelsen himself realises that this scenario is tantamount to both self-creation 
and self-empowerment. In agreement with Kelsen, Lindahl points out that self-
empowerment is a contradiction in terms because ‘an act can only initiate a legal order if 
it is retroactively interpreted as an empowered act [i.e.] the exercise of constituted power 
[authorised by the law].’146  
Lindahl’s analysis reveals that Kelsen has a problem with the basic principle of 
democracy, i.e., the thinking that presupposes the people as the collective subject of rule. 
Kelsen’s problem with the people as a collective subject that is capable of collective action 
stems from the fact that, according to him, the people consists more of ‘a bundle of groups 
                                                          
145 See Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin 
M & Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 11 and 
Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 20(4) 
Ratio Juris 488.  
146 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 11. (Emphasis in 
original) 
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than a coherent mass of one and the same aggregate state (Aggregatzustand).’147 To be 
sure and as alluded to earlier, Lindahl claims that according to Kelsen, the people have 
no prior political existence sans a legal order.148  Accordingly, Lindahl correctly observes 
that Kelsen’s theory of approaching constituent power through attribution is not 
sustainable due to the fact that Kelsen denounces the very subject to whom the 
constitution is attributed, namely the people as a collective unity.149 Lindahl further notes 
that even Kelsen’s argument that the notion of a collective as the subject of norm-creation 
is nothing but the personification of the legal order does not hold.150 Indeed, if it is only in 
a normative sense that one can speak of a unity, the claim that legislation can be 
attributed to a collective subject becomes illogical, and so do the notions of empowerment 
and representation.151 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
147 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 12. 
148  Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin W & 
Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 10.  
149 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 12. 
150 Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 
20(4) Ratio Juris 489. 
151 See Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin 
M & Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 12 and 
Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 20(4) 
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2.3.2. Relationalism and decisionism 
As I pointed out above when I dealt with decisionism, Lindahl also points out that Schmitt 
rejects Kelsen’s consistently normative account of the constitution. 152  Noting the 
inadequacy of some normativist arguments as hinted at above, Lindahl concedes to 
Schmitt’s pivotal assertion that the only viable account of a constitution is a positive one, 
i.e., ‘a constitution is posited by a political subject.’ 153  In fact, as also hinted at by 
Loughlin,154 Lindahl finds Schmitt’s arguments to be an adequate springboard to launch 
his own relationalist theory.155 Thus, even though he arrives at a different conclusion, 
Lindahl’s analysis of the decisionist objections to a normative account of the constitution 
or the founding moment of a polity highlights the inaptness of a normativist approach to 
the constitution. Let me briefly outline what Lindahl presents as the decisionist objections 
to Kelsen’s account of a constitution. 
 According to Lindahl, the first decisionist objections to a normative account of a 
constitution relate to constituent power as the originating power. Lindahl’s analysis of the 
first decisionist objection establishes a link between the thinking of Schmitt and Arendt 
regarding the foundational moment. According to Lindahl, Schmitt and Arendt’s accounts 
of the foundational moment grant constituent power the centre stage. For Schmitt156 and 
Arendt, collective agency is the beginning, i.e., a constitution or the founding of a political 
                                                          
152 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 12. 
153 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 12. 
154 Loughlin M ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2013) European Journal of Political Theory 227. 
155 See for example Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective 
selfhood’ in Loughlin M & Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional 
Form (2008) 16-7 & Loughlin M  
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community is an act of constituent power.157  Lindahl points out that, Schmitt158  and 
Arendt159 argue – contrary to Kelsen’s regressive approach – that the constitution is the 
manifestation of collective agency through the presence and active participation of the 
constituent subject.160 What is also important to note here is that Lindahl’s analysis 
reveals that Schmitt and Arendt reject the connection that Kelsen’s account of a 
constitution establishes between collective agency and representation. The emphasis of 
the second decisionist objection is that constituent power is the originating subject of all 
other powers as well as the subject of the distribution thereof.161 This objection clearly 
refutes the normativist emphasis on the authority of the Grundnorm and is closely linked 
to Schmitt’s rejection of ‘the possibility of a closed, purely normative constitutional 
system.’162  
The third decisionist objection is directed against Kelsen’s rejection of collective 
agency, precisely collective self-rule. Lindahl correctly points out that the third decisionist 
objection reflects that the necessary presupposition of political subjectivity presupposes 
an act of collective self-rule. 163  The presupposition of collective self-rule is indeed 
compatible with the concept of a democratic constitution as ‘the concrete political decision 
                                                          
157 See Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin 
M & Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 13 and 
Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 20(4) 
Ratio Juris 491. 
158 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 289. 
159 Lindahl H ‘The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union’ (2007) 
20(4) Ratio Juris 491. 
160 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 13. 
161 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 126 
162 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 12. 
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of the people capable of political action.’164 In a manner which resonates with the thesis 
of the analysis undertaken here, Schmitt correctly points out that a democratic constitution 
cannot espouse a mythological notion of a personalised legal order; a democratic 
constitution presupposes ‘a people capable of action.’165 
Lindahl correctly observes that the fourth decisionist objection rejects the notion of 
representation. According to Schmitt ‘the people cannot be represented, … [they] are 
either entirely present and engaged or generally not involved.166 Schmitt maintains that 
‘representation contradicts the democratic principle of the self-identity of the people 
present as a political unity.’167 Lindahl, however, correctly notes that, by acknowledging 
that ‘there is no state without representation,’168 Schmitt agrees that constituted powers 
do represent the people in the execution of certain acts.169 However, such acts do not 
include the exercise of constituent power which is the exclusive competency of the 
people.170 The fifth decisionist objection deals with the question of identity insofar as it 
applies to democracy (self-rule). Lindahl claims that Schmitt argues that the definition of 
democracy as the identity of the governing and the governed means that the governing 
and the governed are the same.171 As we shall see in the following subsection, Lindahl 
                                                          
164 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 268. 
165 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 268. 
166 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 289. See also Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards 
an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent 
Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 13.  
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Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 13.  
171 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 13. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
   44 
 
does not entirely accept Schmitt’s arguments regarding the sameness (homogeneity) of 
the governing and the governed.  
 
2.3.3. Assessment 
Lindahl argues that both Kelsen and Schmitt engage in a reductive interpretation of 
identity because they ‘interpret the ‘self’ of self-rule as meaning that the rulers and the 
ruled are the same.’172 According to Lindahl, an interpretation of identity has to take into 
account the two interrelated forms of identity, namely idem-identity (What am I?) and ipse-
identity (Who am I?). What is of particular significance to the analysis undertaken here is 
that Lindahl’s arguments do not only reveal that the two forms of identity are integral to 
the analysis of collective agency, 173  but they also reveal that, compared to Kelsen, 
Schmitt proffers a more viable analysis of collective agency.174  
Lindahl submits that the identity of a human being is distinct from that of a thing 
because it is reflexive. A human being, Lindahl explains, ‘relates to itself as the one who 
acts and who is ultimately at stake in such acts.’175 In other words, a human being is a 
being that in its being is concerned about its very being.176  To further illustrate the 
                                                          
172 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 14. (Emphasis in 
the original) 
173 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
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reflexivity of the identity of a human being in relation to collective agency, Lindahl makes 
reference to Ricoeur’s submission that the questions ‘What am I?’ (idem-identity) and 
‘Who am I?’ (ipse-identity) can also be posed in the first-person plural as ‘What are we?’ 
and ‘Who are we?’177 Lindahl points out that the plural pronoun ‘We’, as part of the 
question ‘Who are we?’ (and the anticipated response thereto), not only introduces us to 
collective agency, but it also introduces an important dimension of collective agency, 
namely shared intentional activity. According to Lindahl’s analysis, shared intentional 
activity is dependent on the reciprocity of intentions of the individual members of a group. 
Thus, the unity implied by collective agency is brought about by a shared and reciprocal 
intention or purpose that allows members to see themselves as being the same or 
different as members may redefine their purpose.178 This line of thinking, I submit, does 
resonate with Schmitt’s thinking.  
Schmitt makes it clear that the word “identity” refers to ‘the existential equality of the 
political unity of the people [in toto].’179 Schmitt’s emphasis on the existential nature of 
equality is actually meant to highlight that the identity of the people in a political unity is 
concrete. The concrete identity of the people is not resultant from norms but from the 
material and political conditions (the existential quality) of the political unity. 180  The 
material conditions of the political unity, I submit, necessitate that the political unity takes 
a decision about its political existence. The realisation of such a decision can only come 
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Walker N (ed) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 15. 
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about if the people have the same purpose and engage in a shared intentional activity to 
ensure their political existence. Schmitt’s claim, therefore, that the presupposition of 
democracy is the substantial homogeneity of a people is premised on the sameness of 
their underlying will to political existence.181  
Furthermore, Schmitt’s interpretation of the sameness of the rulers and the ruled rests 
on an understanding that democracy does not produce a qualitative difference between 
the rulers and the ruled.182 Schmitt states categorically that the definition of democracy 
as the identity of the governing and the governed ‘results from the substantial equality 
that is the essential presupposition of democracy.’183 For Schmitt, democracy makes the 
rulers and the ruled equal because the authority of those who rule is derived from the will 
of those who are ruled. In other words, Lindahl’s analysis of the shared intentional activity 
of the individual members of a group actually vindicates Schmitt’s assertion that 
‘democracy presupposes a people whose members are similar to one another and who 
have the [same] will to political existence.’184 I submit that the thesis of Lindahl’s analysis 
of collective agency is an affirmation of Schmitt’s assertion that the ‘We’ of a collective as 
a unity in action involves a determination of the will to political existence which binds 
together members of a community in mutuality and reciprocity.185  
It is my submission that Lindahl’s assertion that the paradoxical self-constitution of a 
polity is both a moment of constitution by and of a collective self can also be located in 
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the milieu of shared intentional activity. To elucidate the ambiguous self-constitution of a 
polity, Lindahl makes reference to an incident that took place at a meeting of the European 
Social Forum186 in November 2002, where Vittorio Agnoletto of the revolutionary faction 
of the forum declared, ‘Our movement is not reformist; it is radical.’187 Lindahl views 
Agnoletto’s act as an attempt by the revolutionary faction of the forum to marginalise an 
institutional faction comprised of NGOs, because the claim by Vittorio Agnoletto was 
contrary to the applicable charter of principles of Porto Alegre which barred anyone from 
expressing ‘positions that claim to be those of all participants.’188 However, Lindahl’s 
articulation of the inappropriateness of Agnoletto’s act goes beyond the transgression of 
the charter of principles. Lindahl claims that there was no people on whose behalf 
Agnoletto could speak. According to Lindahl, the movement does not satisfy the criteria 
of a political collective unity, hence his consistent reference to the participants of the 
European Social Forum as the multitude. Lindahl submits that a multitude must first 
become a collective subject in order to constitute itself as a political community.189   
Lindahl’s thinking regarding the founding moment diverges with the thinking of 
Schmitt and Arendt in a significant way. The divergence in the thinking of the three 
scholars pertains to what Lindahl refers to as the untenable character of Schmitt and 
                                                          
186 According to Lindahl, the meetings of the European Social Forum were the most visible and radical sites of 
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187 Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin M & 
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Arendt’s simple opposition between presence and representation.190 In agreement with 
Kelsen, Lindahl emphasises that the “We” (as a reference to a collective political unity) ‘is 
never directly present as a unity in action; it must always be represented, even when 
citizens participate in law-creation.’191 Lindahl points out that even though foundational 
moments elicit the presence and action of constituent power which ‘[interrupt] 
representational practices, this rupture does not – and cannot – reveal a people 
immediately present to itself as a collective subject.’192 In other words, Lindahl argues 
that the exercise of constituent power at the founding moment involves a claim to act on 
behalf of a non-existent collective because, as Loughlin observes, ‘the exercise of 
constituent power simultaneously constitutes a people.193 Thus, according to Lindahl, the 
meaning of “representation” as it applies to constituent power does not refer to a “now” in 
which a political community actively founds itself.194 Representation, Lindahl argues, 
refers to ‘an act [that] originates a community through the representation of its origin.’195 
However, what is of particular significance to the analysis undertaken here is that 
Lindahl submits that Agnoletto’s act reflects that there has to be an act that seizes the 
political initiative provided by the openness in politics. Importantly, the act that seizes the 
political initiative also determines the objective (shared intentional activity) that unites a 
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multitude as a collective political unity. Lindahl instructively concludes in this regard that 
‘the price of “radical openness” in politics is the loss of constituent power.’196 Clearly, 
Lindahl’s explication of the openness in politics and the constituent power’s ability and 
power to seize the moment resonates with the thinking of Schmitt and Arendt regarding 
the foundational moment as outlined above. Notwithstanding his argument to the 
contrary, Lindahl’s analysis reveals that constituent power has the power to initiate the 
founding of a political community and also to determine the objective of that political 
community. The South African constitutional discourse needs to shift focus and 
accommodate the popular initiatives of the people at the level of fundamental laws. 
 
3. CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
Close scrutiny of South African constitutional discourse reveals a privileging of 
normativism. The discussion in this section focuses on arguments that are raised in 
respect of the notion of so-called constitutional continuity and the concept of the people 
in the South African context. These arguments will be juxtaposed to what is argued by 
Christodoulidis, Mutua and Schmitt, with the aim of showing that in the South African 
context the influence of normativism makes it difficult to claim that the people are the sole 
subject of constituent power and are governing.  
The discussion of the notion of constitutional continuity will also reflect on the role 
played by the Constitutional Principles during the South African constitution-making 
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process. I will in this context present the notion of constitutional continuity as an anti-
revolutionary strategy that was employed by the National Party government to safeguard 
minority capitalist interests. The discussion of the concept of the people will reflect on 
how the normativist thinking of the fragmentation of constituent power (pluralism) militated 
against establishing the people as the subject of constituent power. The discussion of the 
notion of constitutional continuity and the concept of the people will be followed by a 
summative assessment. 
 
3.1. Constitutional continuity 
As noted above, there is no question regarding the influence of normativism on the post-
sovereign constitution-making model and the dominant scholarly arguments that are 
proffered in South African constitutional discourse about constituent power and the 
Constitution. I indicated above that Kelsen’s concept of the basic norm does not only 
establish a hierarchy of laws, but requires that all laws must be traced back to the 
Grundnorm. The employment of the notion of constitutional continuity ensured that there 
was no break in legality during the establishment of the new South African democratic 
state.  
Arato manifests this line of thought when he states that ‘the post-sovereign model of 
constitution-making generally avoids the notion of a state of nature in which one line of 
thought from Sieyès to Schmitt situates the pouvoir constituant.’197 He commends the 
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post-sovereign constitution-making process for avoiding a revolutionary rupture, which 
basically entails the obliteration of the laws of the previous regime when a new one is 
being founded. Van der Walt refers to this phenomenon of the post-sovereign 
constitution-making process as constitutional dualism which ushers in a fundamentally 
new constitutional order without a revolutionary constitutional rupture.198 On this basis, 
Botha observes that the establishment of liberal constitutional democracy in South Africa, 
together with the requirements and processes of the adoption of the Constitution, present 
the South African political transition as a legal or rechtsstaatliche revolution because it 
did not initiate or entail a total break in legality. What emerges from the instructive 
observations of these scholars is the emphasis on the fact that the success of the South 
African constitution-making process is attributable to the legal containment of the process 
and avoidance of (illegal) popular democratic initiatives.  
The South African political transition was adopted in accordance with normative 
procedural requirements contained in the solemn pact between the ANC and the National 
Party government, namely the Constitutional Principles. The legally binding Constitutional 
Principles, which were contained in Schedule 4 of the interim Constitution, outlined 
requirements and procedures to be followed in the drafting and adoption of the final 
Constitution. According to Botha, the ‘interim Constitution [was itself] adopted in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed in the Constitution of the old regime.’199 In 
other words, as Botha points out, ‘great care was taken to prevent both a legal vacuum 
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and the bearers of political power from acting outside the scope of their properly enacted 
legal authority.’200 Perhaps the most significant manifestation of the so-called great care 
was the rejection of the ANC’s notion of a democratically elected sovereign constituent 
assembly that would draft a legitimate constitution because that would mean that a 
successful revolution, which would require a break in constitutional continuity, had taken 
place in South Africa. 201  In keeping with the normative notion of a superior law or 
Grundnorm, the South African Constitution was made to originate from within the 
parameters of the 1983 Constitution. In fact, Mutua points out that ‘the validity of the 1996 
Constitution rests on the all-white Parliament that approved the Interim Constitution and 
the Constitutional Court.’202 Thus, premium was put on a normative procedure which, as 
I hinted at above, is characterised by Kelsen as the dynamic aspect of law. 
Due to the triumph of the normative thinking of constitutional continuity, it is difficult 
to maintain that the will of people as the subject of constituent power was the sole 
determining factor during the South African constitution-making process. The Constitution 
originated according to a procedure laid down in previous constitutions and the 
Constitutional Principles. In his analysis of the Constitutional Principles and the 
developments around them, Mutua observes that ‘the NP got the better of the deal 
[contained in the Constitutional Principles] as it was protected against the will of the 
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majority to substantially transform the state.’ 203 In this context, the project of social 
transformation in South Africa is proving to be a difficult task because, as Maharaj points 
out, ‘[s]uccessive apartheid governments enacted and enforced a rigorous race-based 
set of laws which ensured that social, economic and political power remained a monopoly 
of the white population.’204 In other words, the Constitution, to some extent, carries into 
the new dispensation burdens and injustices of the old. As a result, s 25(3) of the 
Constitution seeks to strike a difficult balance between the interests of the public (the 
people) and private interests.205 The significance of the balance sought in s 25(3) of the 
Constitution has given rise to calls that are made from across the political and ideological 
divide for the speeding up of land reform in view of the fact that lack of progress in this 
regard is threatening to undo the monumental work that has been done in terms of good 
race relations and reconciliation in South Africa. 206  This does not augur well for 
constitutional stability in South Africa, hence there needs to be mechanisms in place to 
allow for popular democratic initiatives to advance the will of the people.  
As Christodoulidis instructively observes, the notion of a pre-commitment as 
evidenced by the Constitutional Principles, which is a determination of an expectation of 
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the future, is a prominent feature of normativity.207 Normativism reduces the infinite future 
possibilities to what only can and should happen. So, in South Africa, through the 
normativist thinking of constitutional continuity and the Constitutional Principles, the old 
order hoped to have a grip on the future by laying down a stringent pre-determination of 
all future constitutional development and political events. In fact, Mutua instructively 
observes that the Constitutional Principles ‘were an essential link between the past and 
the present; through them the old order would ensure its survival.’ 208  Furthermore, 
watchdog requirements such as the Constitutional Principles were designed to frustrate 
what would definitely be the black-led government’s objective, namely the redistribution 
of land and wealth to the people, particularly those oppressed and dispossessed.209  
The question that arises here is how the ANC elites could agree to these watchdog 
requirements (or the so-called properly enacted legal authority) which were clearly meant 
to protect white monopoly capital. A cogent argument that has been proffered in this 
regard posits the influence of global liberal constitutionalism and the attendant political 
developments that were predominant at the time of South Africa’s constitution-making 
process as some of the reasons. For example, Venter argues that the universal 
condemnation of apartheid and the collapse of the Soviet bloc were the decisive global 
developments because ‘an outcome [of the South African constitution-making process] 
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that bore the marks either of apartheid or of communism was precluded.’210 According to 
Venter, the ANC and the National Party government, therefore, had to re-define their 
short-term political goals, particularly because the government had to face its inevitable 
abdication of power in a transitional process, and the ANC needed to abdicate its 
communist doctrine and prepare for the assumption of the responsibility for 
government.211  
This is indeed an instructive argument. However, my contention is that the global 
political developments played a peripheral role in the constitution-making process when 
compared to local political considerations. The major problem of the National Party 
government was not only that it inevitably had to abdicate power during the transitional 
process. The other major problem faced by the National Party government was that 
abdication of power had significant repercussions for its capitalist constituency or the 
white monopoly capital. The National Party government, therefore, had to have 
guarantees that white monopoly capital will continue to retain control over the economy, 
and those guarantees came in the form of the Constitutional Principles.212 In fact, Venter 
also states that ‘the [apartheid] government, having ‘done the right thing’ by opening itself 
to a negotiated transition, considered itself to be in a position of insisting on the protection 
of the interests of the white population in a new dispensation.’213 The insistence of the NP 
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on the protection of the interests of the minority white population was a very serious issue 
which actually resulted in the deadlock of CODESA in June 1992. The deadlock resulted 
in Mandela writing a letter to De Klerk, the then State President on 4 July 1992, wherein 
he stated that the ANC ‘cannot accept an undemocratic constitution aimed at addressing 
the fears of a minority party about its own future at the cost of democracy.’214 According 
to Mandela, the National Party government was essentially opposed to the 
democratisation of South Africa. Since the NP finally had its way by having the ANC agree 
to its proposal of constitutional continuity, it can be argued that the Constitution was not 
determined on the basis of the political will of the people as the subject of constituent 
power. The interests of white monopoly capital and the business sector had a major 
influence on how the Constitution was crafted.215 
It must be emphasised that the normative approach to constituent power during South 
Africa’s constitution-making process has culminated in a conundrum, especially in light of 
the intensifying onslaught faced by South Africa’s constitutional democracy. The liberal 
doublespeak of the Constitution representing both constitutional continuity and a decisive 
break with the past has come back to haunt South Africa’s constitutional democracy. The 
intensifying onslaught faced by South Africa’s constitutional democracy, the riots and land 
occupations stem from a realisation on the part of the people that the revolution was (as 
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Botha hints at)216 indeed deferred.  There is a growing justifiable sentiment among the 
South African polity that the framing of the constitution-making process effectively 
favoured the interests of the privileged liberal monopoly capital at the expense of the 
masses of black people impoverished by decades of colonial and racist politics in South 
Africa. What the South African constitutional discourse must do now is to encourage 
people-driven democratic initiatives, which I will outline in Section 4, to take place outside 
normative regulation. The disturbing political developments and incidents, which I just 
referred to, reflect how unsustainable it is to normatively regulate the constituent power 
of the people through the notion of legal or constitutional continuity and normative pre-
commitments.  
 
3.2. We the people (shall govern)  
The preceding discussion obviously puts in question the declaration of “We the people” 
in the preamble of the South African Constitution, which has its genesis in one of the 
clauses of the Freedom Charter, namely “The people shall govern”.217 It is my contention 
that “We the people”, as it finds expression in the South African Constitution, 
paradoxically represents a moment of recognition and subjugation of the will of the 
people. In spite of this declaration, the role of the people as the subject of constituent 
power is largely subsumed within constituted authority, such as parliament and the courts. 
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For example, parliament has the powers to amend the founding provisions of the 
Constitution, i.e., the fundamental decision of the people, through set high-threshold 
majorities. South African constitutional discourse does not encourage, in a non-
normatively regulated manner, people-driven initiatives that may lead to the amendment 
of the founding provisions or that may ratify the decision of the parliamentary super 
majorities.  
I did indicate above that the notion of constitutional continuity as applied in the South 
African context had a hindering effect with regard to establishing the people as the subject 
of constituent power. It is nevertheless the case that the argument of constitutional 
continuity that was advanced by the National Party government, particularly when it 
rejected the ANC’s notion of a sovereign, democratically elected constitution-making 
body, was fictitious. There was effectively no constitutionalism that could have been at 
stake in South Africa during the dismantling of apartheid. In fact, Arato points out that 
“[i]ndeed the legality that is being preserved in many of the cases [of the post-sovereign 
constitution-making process] is fictional, or is rather created for the occasion, since the 
old regimes [that are being dismantled in most cases are] dictatorships with paper 
constitutions that may have routinely disregarded and not only violated their own ritualised 
legality” 218  The 1983 Constitution was based on parliamentary supremacy or 
parliamentary sovereignty as opposed to constitutional supremacy. As Venter points out, 
South African constitutional law was centred on a written constitution that had no superior 
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status, and power was concentrated in the head of government and the state.219 In other 
words, there was in South Africa a constitution without constitutionalism.  
Against this backdrop, a close reading of the debate during this trajectory of the 
negotiations and constitution-making process reveals that what was actually at stake was 
not constitutionalism but the position of the subject of constitution-making power. The 
ANC wanted to entrench the people in the position of the subject of constitution-making 
power through a democratically elected Constituent Assembly that ‘will not be subject to 
the veto or overseeing powers of any other body.’220 The National Party government, in 
contradistinction, wanted a constitutionally regulated authority, which eventually came in 
the form of the Constitutional Assembly, to be the constitution-making authority that would 
be overseen by the judiciary. There is no doubt that this debate was decisive in the 
crafting of the Constitution. My contention is that a sovereign Constituent Assembly during 
the South African constitution-making process would have come very close to being a 
truly democratic mechanism to ensure that the Constitution was established according to 
the will of the people. Even the popular democratic initiatives that are mooted in the 
analysis that is undertaken here have at the apex a sovereign democratic Constituent 
Assembly that will not be subject to the veto powers of any other body.    
Actually, Arato himself makes it clear that, as opposed to the classic European 
Constituent Assemblies, Constitutional Assemblies that are established in the milieu of 
the post-sovereign constitution-making model ‘are not sovereign constituent assemblies, 
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but they are meant to be elected or constituted for the purpose of constitution drafting [in 
accordance with an extant constitution and ratification by the courts].’221 The nature of the 
Constitutional Assemblies of the post-sovereign constitution-making process is in 
accordance with the fact that the post-sovereign constitution-making process does not 
allow space for the manifestation of the sovereign will of the people. This observation is 
evinced by Arato’s observation regarding the two-stage character of the post-sovereign 
constitution-making process vis-à-vis the historical and political developments that took 
place in France, Massachusetts and Philadelphia. According to Arato, the historical and 
political developments that took place in the specified countries show that ‘the post-
sovereign model envisages no instance that can claim to represent in the absolute sense 
the sovereign will of the people.222 So, regardless of arguments to the contrary, the South 
African Constitutional Assembly, a body that supposedly represented the people of South 
Africa as the bearer of political power, could not have exercised the will of the people. On 
this basis, Mutua observes that the South African Constitutional Assembly ‘essentially 
rubber-stamped prior political choices, despite projecting the perception that it was 
making a new constitution.’223  
As alluded to above, the Constituent Assembly that is envisaged by Colon-Rios and 
by the analysis that is undertaken here is of a different nature to the one advocated by 
the post-sovereign constitution-making process. The popular democratic initiatives that 
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will precede the mooted Constituent Assembly will, contrary to what transpired in the 
cases of France, Massachusetts and Philadelphia,224 ensure that the people can keep in 
check the compliance of the will of the Constituent Assembly with the will of the people. 
 
3.3. Pluralism and constituent power 
Let us now consider the notion of pluralism vis-à-vis the democratic concept of the people. 
In his analysis of the two interpretations of the South African constitution-making process, 
Botha refers to the notion that by splintering sovereignty and introducing a public 
participation programme, the South African post-sovereign constitution-making process 
avoided ‘playing into the hands of those who pass off particular interests as the public 
interest and who seek to reduce the fluidity of individual and collective identities to the 
relative fixity of semi-official definitions of who belong and who don’t.’225 Botha points out 
that it is argued that by splintering sovereignty, the constitution-making process ‘injected 
the particularity of needs and the plurality of subject positions which characterise civil 
society into the constitution-making process.’226 It is however important to keep in mind 
here the limitations of public participation programmes as identified by Buccus and Hicks 
and as referred to in section 1.2 above. 
                                                          
224 Arato A ‘Post-sovereign constitution-making in Hungary: After success, partial failure, and now what?’ (2010) 
26(1) SAJHR 23-4. 
225  Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s 
constitution-making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 75. 
226  Botha H ‘Instituting public freedom or extinguishing constituent power? Reflections on South Africa’s 
constitution-making experiment’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 78. 
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Van der Walt also advocates irreducible plurality as he expresses his rejection of the 
irreducible unity which is often invoked by Africa’s revolutionary Heads of State.227 Van 
der Walt argues that the emphasis by several African Heads of State and academics on 
‘our own constitution’ begs the question of ‘how indigenous aspirations voiced [by these 
figures] can seriously hope to become the exclusive foundation for co-existence in social 
contexts that are ‘irremediably’ heterogeneous … without risking a new apartheid; without 
risking again a purity driven apartness without partnership.228 In Kelsenian style (even 
though he maintains that his argument is based on Arendt), Van der Walt instead supports 
a democratic constitutionalism wherein the people are united by a system of law.229   
It is my contention that pluralism in the South African constitutional discourse (and in 
a manner akin to what Christodoulidis observes about the American constitutional 
theorists)230 is resultant from an obsession about the counter-majoritarian problem and 
the tension between the notion of “the people shall govern” (self-rule) and the rule of law. 
The notion of civil society organisations partaking in constitution-making (or the instituted 
public freedom, as one view by Botha refers to this political development) provided the 
much-needed counter-pole to the will of the overwhelming majority which Mandela 
presented as the ANC’s position in accordance with the democratic doctrine of one-
                                                          
227 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 113. 
228 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
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229 Van der Walt J ‘Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: A case of competing 
retroactivities’ (2010) 26(1) SAJHR 115. 
230 Christodoulidis E ‘The aporia of sovereignty: on the representation of the people in constitutional discourse’ 
(2001) The King’s College Law Journal 111. 
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person-one-vote.231 It is in this context that Van der Walt’s quotation232 of Arato’s ‘Post-
Sovereign Constitution-Making and its Pathology in Iraq,’ ironically highlights the counter-
majoritarian dilemma of pluralism vis-à-vis the democratic concept of the people: 
If ‘the people’ can be said to be present in th[is] new type of [post-sovereign] constituent process 
this is so in a plural, complex, and always limited way that has neither the possibility of the absolute 
no of the referendum, nor the unlimited constituent power incorporated in an assembly. 
This quote actually reflects that pluralism does violence to (i.e. limits) the sovereign 
right of the people by ensuring that the people cannot act as a sovereign unity, because 
their sovereignty becomes limited and fragmented. During South Africa’s transition, the 
South African people needed to respond as a sovereign unity to the substantive question 
of how the Constitution should be determined. The employment and advocacy of 
pluralism, however, ensured that the question about the political existence of the South 
African polity was decided in the milieu of interventions from civil society and public 
questioning and the demand for justification. 233  However, as Böckenförde notes 
‘[e]conomic and social interest groups must be confined to their specific realm and 
prevented from taking control over political functions of the [people] which itself must be 
shielded against political pluralism.’234  
Pluralism or the fragmentation of the sovereign constituent power of the people has 
the traces of Kelsen’s normativist thinking of the concept of the people. Lindahl maintains 
                                                          
231 http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4141 (accessed 23 October 2015). (My emphasis) 
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that, according to Kelsen, ‘the people in a democracy has no distinct and prior political 
existence, because its unity is but the unity of the legal order.’235 In other words, the 
people without a system of law are formless and exist in a state of nature. However, 
Schmitt tells us that ‘[t]he people as the bearer of the constitution-making power are not 
a stable, organized organ … [but] they are nevertheless capable of … willing and are able 
to say yes or no to the fundamental questions of their political existence.’236 Schmitt 
concludes that ‘[a]s long as a people have a will to political existence, the people are 
superior to every formation and normative framework.’ 237  Accordingly, adopting 
Christodoulidis’ formulation of the question that confronts the American constitutional 
theorists in respect of the counter-majoritarian problem, it can be asked: How can it be 
justified that the Constitution is committed to the notion that the South African state rests 
on the authority of the people whereas that authority was, first, curtailed during the 
constitution-making process and, eventually, subjected to a constitutional dispensation 
with a limiting normative framework?  
 
3.4. Assessment 
The notion of constitutional continuity rests on the normative thinking of validity and 
legitimacy. In the South African context, the normative thinking of validity and legitimacy 
is in turn closely linked to the notion of dualism (the ushering in of a new constitutional 
order without a break in legality based on the old order). On the question of the legitimacy 
                                                          
235  Lindahl H ‘Constituent power and reflexive identity: Towards an ontology of collective selfhood’ in Loughlin W & 
Walker N The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2008) 10.  
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(and validity) of a new constitution, Schmitt asserts that the legitimacy of a constitution is 
not based on previously valid constitutional laws.238 According to Schmitt, a constitution, 
‘as a new, fundamental political decision of the people, cannot subordinate itself to an 
earlier constitution and make itself dependent on it.’239 According to Schmitt’s thinking, 
therefore, the basis of the validity of the Constitution did not have to be the 1983 
Constitution, but the decision of the people. In light of Schmitt’s observations and the 
challenges facing South Africa’s constitutional democracy currently, what is needed is a 
fundamental shift in the country’s constitutional discourse to allow the people more space 
to assert themselves as the subject of constituent power.  
Furthermore, the employment of the concept of constitutional continuity and the 
establishment of the Constitutional Assembly was, to use Christodoulidis’ turn of phrase, 
paradoxically a moment of the surrender of self-constitution to a pre-constituted order, 
and a moment of recognition and subjugation of constituent power, respectively.240 What 
this means is that in the normativist South African constitutional discourse, the post-
sovereign constitution-making model is actually commended for containing collective 
agency within constituted power (the Constitutional Court and the Constitutional 
Assembly)  and then ably attributing the act of constituted power (certification of the 
Constitution) to the bearer of constituent power, the people. To use again Christodoulidis’ 
turn of phrase, the people as the subject of constituent power (an unstable and 
disorganised organ in its nature241), became institutionalised in that it was operationalised 
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within a fore-structure of norms, namely the interim Constitution with its Constitutional 
Principles, which bestowed it legal meaning.242  
Indeed, as revealed by one line of thought that Botha refers to, the process of the 
authorship of the Constitution largely became the preserve of lawyers and judges,243 and 
the voice of the people could only be heard through legally regulated presentations. The 
litmus test with regard to the adoption of the Constitution, therefore, was its compliance 
with the Constitutional Principles; 244  it was not adopted purely on the basis that it 
represented the social needs and political aspirations of the people. The judicial 
certification of the constitutional text according to the Constitutional Principles, which is 
unprecedented in the history of constitutionalism, 245  played a prominent role in 
subjugating the so-called ‘out-dated and destructive’246 constituent power and popular 
sovereignty.  
Furthermore, on close scrutiny, the normativist arguments in respect of the concept 
of the people referred to above bring to the fore the contentious concept of representation. 
I argue that the so-called ‘multi-vocal or pluralistic civil society representativeness’ of the 
Constitutional Assembly (Arato),247 allowed for the entrenchment of established capitalist 
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interests, particularly in s 25 of the Constitution. As reflected above through the 
observations of the various political formations, the country’s constitutional democracy 
now has to urgently contend with land redistribution to avoid the undoing of the 
monumental gains of 22 years of democracy. The country has to contend with eruptions 
of political moments in the form of land grabs and violent protests as the people ventilate 
their aspirations (political will) in non-institutionalised channels. As shown by Venter’s 
observations above, there seems to be a sustained lack of belief in the merits of the liberal 
foundations upon which the Constitution is built. The eruption of violent protests and land 
grabs manifest both the resistance of the will of the people to a normativist or 
constitutional regulation and the tension between democracy and constitutionalism. 
Mechanisms for the democratic initiation of constituent power need to be found, and that 
is the subject of the following section.  
 
4. RE-ESTABLISHING THE PEOPLE AS THE SUBJECT OF CONSTITUENT POWER 
It is my contention that Colon-Rios’ observations in Weak Constitutionalism regarding the 
concept of constituent power in the milieu of the tension between constitutionalism and 
democracy are relevant to the South African discourse. In light of the challenges faced by 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy, there is a need, as hinted at in Section 1, to 
ensure that South Africa’s approach to democracy puts the emphasis on democracy at 
the level of fundamental laws.  
In this section I will, first, briefly outline Colon-Rios’ observations about the two 
prominent approaches to democracy, namely the substantive and procedural 
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approaches. The aim here is to show that the two approaches are what South Africa’s 
constitutional discourse is mainly and mistakenly focused on, thereby obscuring 
democracy at the dimension of fundamental laws. I will also show here how the analysis 
undertaken here relates to Colon-Rios’ analysis. Secondly, relying heavily on Colon Rios’ 
suggestions, I will suggest mechanisms that can be implemented to ensure both that 
South Africa’s constitutional discourse is based on the will of the people and that the 
people, as the subject of constituent power, are governing.  
 
4.1. Constitutionalism and democracy  
According to Colon-Rios, democracy has two dimensions. The first dimension is 
democracy at the level of daily governance, and the second dimension is democracy at 
the level of fundamental laws. Colon-Rios draws an instructive distinction between the 
various approaches to democracy and suggests that these approaches are subject to the 
perspective one adopts when judging whether a regime or state is premised on the 
principle of the rule by the people. He identifies two approaches to or interpretations of 
democracy, namely the substantive interpretation of democracy (Dworkin) and the 
procedural interpretation of democracy (Waldron).248  
Colon-Rios argues that, according to Dworkin’s substantive interpretation of 
democracy, the fundamental question is whether or not a particular regime’s ‘laws and 
institutions give citizens equal treatment and allow them to participate in everyday 
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decision-making.’249 According to Colon-Rios, what is key to Dworkin is the content of the 
(liberal) constitution. Colon-Rios states that, for Dworkin, ‘if a constitution provides for the 
rights and procedures that make partnership democracy possible, it does not make sense 
to be concerned about who adopted it and how, or to worry about the possibility of 
important constitutional transformations.’ 250  According to Waldron’s procedural 
interpretation of democracy as outlined by Colon-Rios, the key question is a democratic 
procedure that is premised on the principle of parliamentary supremacy as opposed to 
ordinary representative institutions.251 Colon-Rios states that, according to Waldron, ‘the 
people have a right to participate in equal terms in all aspects of their community’s 
governance … [including] decisions of high principle.’ 252  Decisions of high principle, 
without doubt, include decisions about the political existence of the people as a political 
unity. Waldron’s procedural interpretation of democracy puts these decisions in the hands 
of the legislature as the representative of the people. Colon-Rios points out that Dworkin 
and Waldron’s ‘conceptions of democracy only operate within the level of democratic 
governance … [and they] fail to address … the question of the democratic legitimacy of a 
constitutional regime.253 
In the South African context, constitutional theorists who support Dworkin’s 
substantive interpretation of democracy may argue that there is no need to alter South 
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Africa’s constitutional discourse because (1) the Constitution has the right content in the 
form of the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution); and (2) ss 59, 72 and 118 give 
citizens equal treatment and allow them to participate in everyday legislative decision-
making.254  Constitutional theorists who support Waldron’ procedural interpretation of 
democracy may argue that the Constitution is sufficiently democratic. To evince this view, 
they may refer to ss 53 and 74 and 112 of the Constitution. The specified constitutional 
provisions regulate the quorum and extraordinary majorities needed when decisions are 
to be taken in the national and provincial legislatures.  
It is evident that arguments such as the ones I just referred to in the South African 
context are mainly focused on the first dimension of democracy and they ignore 
constituent power (the will of the people). The mistake here is to equate the will of the 
people, which actually relates to the fundamental political decision of a polity, to issues of 
daily governance, such as the need for the legislature to facilitate public participation. This 
is not to say public participation in this context is not important, but it should not, as Colon-
Rios points out, obscure democracy at the level of fundamental laws. Colon-Rios states 
that the concept of constituent power ‘[has] a direct relationship with the democratic ideal 
… [because it] is the expression of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws.’255 
For the theory of democracy at the dimension of fundamental laws the question is: What 
mechanisms exist for the initiation of popular democratic initiatives or the constituent 
                                                          
254 These constitutional provisions regulate public access and involvement in the national and provincial legislatures. 
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power of the people outside the confines of the Constitution and by the people 
themselves? 
Colon-Rios’ explication of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism 
highlights (as does the analysis that is undertaken here) the necessity to both determine 
the Constitution at the level of fundamental laws according to the will of the people, and 
to re-establish a meaningful role of the people as the subject of constituent power. Colon-
Rios states that: 
The second dimension of democracy … is not about the daily workings of the state’s political 
apparatus, but about … how a constitutional regime came into existence and how it can be altered. 
In that respect, it revolves around the following two questions: (1) Is this constitution the result of a 
democratic process?; and (2) Can this constitution be altered through democratic means? To ask 
about democracy at the level of the fundamental laws, then, is to ask about two different moments 
in the life of a constitutional arrangement: constitution-making and (the possibility of) fundamental 
constitutional change. These are the moments in which a juridical order can come closer to 
affirming the principle of popular sovereignty and in which the question of democratic legitimacy 
appears more clearly. 
It will be noted that, in line with Colon-Rios’ observations in this quote, I have dealt in the 
preceding sections with the question of how the South African constitutional regime came 
into existence. I argued that the influence of the Kelsenian thinking of the constitution had 
an expansive influence on the South African post-sovereign constitution-making process 
to the extent that the South African constitutional discourse does not really acknowledge 
the people as the subject of constituent power. 
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What is also important to note is that Colon-Rios’ conceptualisation of “the people” in 
respect of current democracies is not underwritten by normativist thinking. In fact, Colon-
Rios rejects the normativist conceptualisation of the people as he states in a Schmittian 
style that his theory of weak constitutionalism sees a citizen as ‘someone who participates 
in the democratic legitimation of the constitutional regime and knows that … it can be 
changed.’ 256  Here, like Schmitt, 257  Colon-Rios is emphasising the capability of the 
constitution-making subject to act. Colon-Rios, furthermore, rejects the normativist 
thinking of democracy and asserts that ‘democracy at the level of fundamental laws … 
[entails] a political practice that takes place outside the confines of the established 
constitution.’258 Finally, in line with the analysis that is undertaken here (as it will be shown 
in the subsection below), Colon-Rios rejects Waldron’s overestimation of the legislature, 
that is, the emphasis and overreliance on the legislature to make decisions on behalf of 
the people. 
4.2. Mechanisms of initiating constituent power and constitutional amendments 
Colon-Rios argues that ‘democracy at the level of the fundamental laws [is not] a regime 
… [but] a moment in the life of a democratic polity that a juridical order makes possible.’259
This is in line with Schmitt’s argument, as Colon-Rios also notes,260 that ‘[t]he further 
execution and formulation of a political decision reached by the people in unmediated 
256 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012) 155. 
257 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 268. 
258 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012). 
259 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012). 
260 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012). 
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form requires some organization, a procedure, for which modern democracy developed 
certain practices and customs.’261 Basically, I have nothing to add to the mechanisms 
suggested by Colon-Rios. Indeed, ‘[the South African] democracy requires the actual 
participation of citizens in the positing and (re)positing of the fundamental laws through 
mechanisms such as [people-driven] constituent assemblies, referendums [and] popular 
initiatives.’262 
In the South African context the process can be as follows: (1) The collection of 
signatures which lead to people-driven izimbizos; (2) people-driven izimbizos that should 
be precursors to people-driven referendums; 263 (3) people-driven referendums to gauge 
the people’s belief in the merits of the current Constitution; and (4) a Constituent 
Assembly as the apex of this process. I share Colon-Rios’ view that a democratically 
elected Constituent Assembly activated by a popular referendum to deliberate on the 
merits of a constitution and, if needs be, draft a new constitution based on the will of the 
people comes closer to an exercise of the people’s constituent power.264 The decision of 
such an assembly would, of course, have to be ratified by the people through another 
referendum. My submission is that this process can be much more democratic ‘than an 
ordinary legislature engaging in profound constitutional changes.’265 
261 Schmitt C Constitutional Theory (2008) 132. 
262 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012). 
263  Sections 84(1)(g) and 127(2)(f) make the calling of referendums the prerogative of only the President and 
Premiers in accordance with national legislation. 
264 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012) 157. 
265 Colon-Rios J Weak constitutionalism: Democratic legitimacy and the Question of Constituent power (2012) 157. 
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It should be noted that even the Constitutional Review Committee, which is 
established in terms of s 45(1) (c) of the Constitution,266 is a far cry from the suggested 
process in terms of the exercise of the people’s constituent power. The Constitutional 
Review Committee is a constitutionally regulated body, which can hardly be sufficient in 
ensuring that the people exercise their democratic right to govern at the level of 
fundamental laws. The work of the Constitutional Review Committee is largely resultant 
from petitions and is deliberated in the committee’s meetings wherein invitees are not 
allowed to vote.267 The Constitutional Review Committee also reports to the different 
Houses of Parliament on a question which it decided according to the agreement among 
the majority of its members.268 This means that fundamental decisions on issues that 
could not be settled during the constitution-making process (as this committee defines its 
work) 269  are taken within a constitutionally regulated environment, allowing no 
substantive opportunity to ordinary citizens to decide for themselves. 
Colon-Rios makes an instructive observation that ‘[the people’s] lack of opportunities 
to re-create their fundamental laws, to engage in acts of democratic re-constitution, puts 
into question the democratic legitimacy of the constitutional regimes under which they 
live.270 In this context, South Africa should avoid what Lindahl observes with regard to 
Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm, that is, a situation where further acts regarding 
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fundamental laws move within the legal order, such that constituent power is suspended 
in favour of constituted power.  
It may be argued that the Constitution encourages popular participation through 
provisions contained in ss 59, 72 and 118. However, these provisions are not sufficient 
for the type of democratic constitutional discourse mooted here because they are 
operationalised under what may be called strong constitutionalism. The initiative is the 
prerogative of the legislatures and therefore ss 59, 72 and 118 do not encourage 
unfettered popular democratic initiative or a bottom-up approach. I share Colon-Rios’ view 
that what is wrong with Waldron’s interpretation of democracy is that ‘[p]opular 
participation at the level of the fundamental laws cannot merely mean that th people are 
allowed to have elected representatives take decisions in their name [particularly 
decisions that pertain to their political existence].’271 The ultimate decision about the type 
and form of political existence of the South African polity should reside with the people. 
Colon-Rios states that even in terms of Sieyès notion of the inevitable necessity of 
representatives of the people, ‘representatives did not [and cannot] have the power to 
create or change the constitution.’272  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In analysing the concept of constituent power in relation to the South African constitution, 
I set my discussion in the milieu of the Schmitt-Kelsen debate and argued in favour of 
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Schmitt’s thinking. As it is noted by Colon-Rios, ‘Schmitt [was] no democrat, and yet [his] 
theories of constituent power have important democratic implications.’273 Relying on the 
instructive observations of Schmitt, Christodoulidis, Mutua, Prempeh and Colon-Rios, I 
illustrated that the normativist thinking of the constitution, the concept of constitutional 
continuity (coupled with the attendant notions of Constitutional Principles and pluralism) 
and the normative concept of the people, militated against crafting the Constitution 
entirely according to the political will of the people. In order to mitigate the challenges 
faced by South Africa’s constitutional democracy, the constitutional discourse must 
change to enable concrete people-driven initiatives. 
It is my submission that it is possible to re-establish the people as the subject of 
constituent power through people-driven initiatives that entrench democracy at the level 
of fundamental laws. Relying on Colon-Rios’ thinking, I pointed out that the extant public 
participation programmes must be accompanied by initiatives such as the collection of 
signatures, referendums, izimbizos and Constituent Assemblies, to strengthen the 
foundation of South Africa’s constitutional discourse. In other words, in line with Colon-
Rios’ main thesis in Weak Constitutionalism, South Africa must avoid strong 
constitutionalism to encourage democracy at the level of fundamental laws through 
popular initiatives. Equally, the legislature, as a representative institution, should not be 
the subject of constituent power. The people, as the rightful subject of constituent power, 
must always govern.  
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Colon-Rios states that ‘[d]emocracy requires understanding constitution-making as 
an exercise of self-government that must take place in a context of democratic openness 
and that requires the maximization of [people-driven initiatives].’274 He further notes that 
the kind of mechanisms he suggests and also put forward in this analysis have an ‘uneasy 
relationship with constitutional forms: as means for the exercise of constituent, rather than 
constituted power, they always operate against the constitutional regime that contains 
them.’275 However, as Colon Rios concludes in his instructive reading of Schmitt, ‘no 
democratic constitution and constitutionalism can confer constituent power or prescribe 
the ways this power [must be exercised]: the constituent subject (the people in a 
democracy) can (re)determine its form of political existence whenever it decides such an 
action necessary.’ 276  Constituent power is an existential political power which finds 
expression in the will of the people. People-driven initiatives can provide the much-
needed mechanisms of preserving the political unity of the South African people. They 
can also stabilise and pre-empt existing and imminent political tensions and conflicts.  
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